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Donors have been increasingly using budget support since 2000 to associate development 
aid delivery with improved development institutions and good policies that will ensure 
aid effectiveness, in particular in West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
countries. There is however little evidence that budget support promotes good policies 
and institutions in WAEMU countries. The purpose of this quantitative research was to 
explore relationships between budget support as an official development assistance 
modality and public expenditures efficiency as an indicator of public governance quality. 
The aid effectiveness theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia 
informed research questions to determine whether budget support generates efficiency 
gains or losses in public governance quality measured by government spending efficiency 
in recipient countries. The study used a time series cross-sectional design with 8 
WAEMU countries which benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015. Panel 
regressions were used to test relationships between public expenditure efficiency and 
budget support variables. Findings indicate that the use of budget support by donors and 
proportion of budget support amount in government revenues and in total aid predict 
public expenditures efficiency. This prediction is mediated by initial level of efficiency 
and moderated by political context. The findings provide evidence for aid providers to 
use budget support to stimulate public governance quality in the neediest and most poorly 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
Introduction 
Official development assistance (ODA or development aid) is an important 
revenue source that could compensate the shortage of government revenues in developing 
countries and thus support the production of public goods (Molenaers, 2012). ODA may 
take various forms including funds (grants or borrowings), technical support, policy 
advice, and cooperation partnerships. Donors could provide aid directly to governments 
or through intermediaries such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) considered that ODA 
integrates a grant element, meaning that donor support should be rewarded mainly 
regarding generated economic development and welfare improvements in developing 
countries. According to the OECD (2005), loans from developed to developing countries 
can constitute ODA when recipient countries only partially reimburse them, the non-
reimbursed component being the grant element. This led policymakers and academics 
from developed and developing countries to scrutinize the term aid effectiveness, that is 
how and the extent to which foreign aid contributes to advance development in aid 
recipient countries. 
Insufficient savings in developing nations was the primary purpose of 
development assistance in line with the Harrod-Domar economic growth model which 
considers savings as the main economic growth driver (Hansen, 2000). The “Marshall 
Plan” initiated in the aftermath of the Second World War responded to this purpose of 
supplementing the impressive destruction of capital during the war in European countries. 
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Since the initiation of this Marshall Plan followed by ODA delivered to Non-
European countries, academics and policymakers from developed and developing 
countries have debated the effectiveness of ODA in producing development outcomes 
such as economic growth and social improvement. Aid effectiveness has shaped 
international development and the positioning of the international community in terms of 
development challenges. The United Nations summit on Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) organized in 2010 put a focus on development aid effectiveness. It called upon 
international development stakeholders to exert efforts to improve the outcomes of ODA, 
mainly regarding accelerated poverty reduction and reduced inequality both within and 
between states. The Busan declaration on development effectiveness, adopted by 
stakeholders in 2011, further emphasizes this political agenda by strengthening the Paris 
declaration framework and Accra Agenda for Action on aid effectiveness enacted in 2005 
and 2008 respectively. This Busan policy framework is a commitment to a 
comprehensive approach to aid development with a shift from aid to development 
effectiveness. The latter involves shared accountability, ownership of development 
strategies by aid recipients, results-based management, and harmonization between aid 
providers. This indicates stronger constraints on political leaders and decision-makers to 
increase the effectiveness of public policies. Development aid as an essential component 
of international cooperation should be justified to be legitimate. 
An impressive academic literature was developed from the beginning of 90s on 
aid effectiveness as little development progress was seen in aid recipient countries, in 
particular in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to Hansen (2000), a seeming consensus 
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amongst donors emerged from this debate on aid effectiveness that ODA is useful only in 
the presence of quality institutions and when recipient governments implement the right 
development policies. The OECD development assistance committee donors (OECD-
DAC) and other multilateral donors like the European Commission and World Bank have 
oriented ODA to confer a greater importance to aid delivery modalities that should incite 
for governance improvements. Budget support is one of these development aid modalities 
that aid providers have used increasingly. Donors perceived this aid modality as relevant 
in the context of Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness adopted in 2005, which defines 
conditions of aid effectiveness by emphasizing various principles including ownership of 
an unique development agenda by recipient countries, alignment of donors to this unique 
development framework, and coordination and mutual accountability for results based 
management. 
In this context, scholars like Tavakoly and Gregory (2013) have argued that 
budget support can contribute to the Paris declaration principles such as better alignment 
of development assistance to recipient country’s development agenda; strengthening 
national ownership; better harmonization between donors; and improved fiscal 
management. The idea that budget support explicitly targets the improvement of 
institutions and public policymaking in recipient countries has been little investigated and 
discussed by academics and policymakers. There is still a controversy surrounding what 
constitutes a right institution that favors development, but also with regards to the role 
politics and policies should play in association with systems in the development process. 
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This research contributes to the literature on aid and governance by focusing on 
budget support and its relationship with quality of public governance, measured by 
efficiency of public expenditure according to the West Africa Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU). Budget support is a specific aid delivery in which donors and aid 
recipients agree to associate aid amount disbursement with policy reform agendas 
(European Commission, 2012). It is in line with the policy conditionality view that 
donors can use aid to generate enough incentives for institutional quality and sound 
policies. While there are various conceptual frameworks for operationalizing good 
governance in literature, this research adopts the pragmatic view of developmental 
management. It therefore approaches quality governance through public expenditure 
efficiency to reflect improvements in policymaking and institutional quality among aid 
recipient countries that budget support may generate. Donors’ view that aid delivered 
through budget support could be more efficient than other aid modalities indicate that 
there are institutional changes budget support can generate for improved management of 
public expenditures and dynamic allocation of government revenues including aid. 
Therefore, the focus of this research is to provide insights regarding the extent to which 
budget support result in improved public governance through efficiency gains or losses in 
government spending in WAEMU countries. Potentially, the study could generate new 
knowledge to inform aid providers and recipients regarding ways to improve aid practice 
and development effectiveness. The study could also explain the debate whether to afford 




The next section will explain the background of the study. It will be followed by 
the problem statement, theoretical framework, and purpose of the study. Research 
questions and hypotheses will be discussed, followed by the nature of the study. This 
chapter also covers theoretical constructs and assumptions and limitations as well as the 
study’s thematic, geographical, and chronological scope and delimitations of the 
research. The last section is a summary. 
Background 
Aid effectiveness is subject to intense controversies. In 2000, Burnside and Dollar 
advanced that aid is effective when the recipient implements right policies and has 
appropriate institutions in place. While, Burnside and Dollar (2000) said that aid did not 
affect governance although governance conditioned aid effectiveness, researchers like 
Asongu (2013), Easterly and Williamson (2011), Faye and Niehaus (2011), Nunn and 
Qian (2014); Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) pointed out the institutional perils of aid by 
insisting on its failure to build quality institutions and incite right policies.). Other 
researchers like Molenaers, Dellepiane, and Fraust, (2015), Kalyvitis, Stengos and 
Vlachaki (2012) and Mounir (2015) considered that institutional quality and proper 
systems could positively mediate aid effectiveness.  
Notwithstanding this dispute between optimistic and pessimist scholars on aid 
effectiveness, the OECD-DAC donors and multilateral donors such as the European 
Development Fund and the World Bank have developed policy-based aid modalities such 
as budget support with the purpose to influence public governance quality in recipient 
countries. Budget support is an aid modality that consists of providing financial resources 
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directly into recipients’ public budgets, within an agreed policy framework, which is 
known as policy conditionality (Hayman, 2011). According to the European Commission 
(2012), the policy conditionality framework is designed by the donor to motivate 
recipient governments to promote appropriate governance settings and policymaking that 
ensure aid effectiveness. Scholars’ attempts to assess the effectiveness of budget support 
have considered various Paris declaration principles. Swedlund (2013) advanced that 
budget support was used to influence policy choices in recipient countries. Hayman 
(2011) said that (donors use budget support to impose their political views in recipient 
countries mainly regarding the promotion of democratic institutions (Hayman, 2011). 
Tavakoly and Smith (2013) argued that budget support can improve public financial 
management while generating transaction costs. Selaya and Thiele (2012) found that 
budget support deteriorates bureaucratic efficacy.  
Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) argued that aid is subject to decreasing 
productivity margins. Therefore, a donors’ policy concern is the possibility that budget 
support as an aid modality generates constant or increasing productivity margins to 
ensure continued aid effectiveness during the advent of increasing aid. One way of 
perceiving this nondecreasing marginal return is the enhanced efficient use of 
development assistance and public revenues in such a way that increasing aid availability 
is associated with aid effectiveness. Bourguignon and Plateau developed a theoretical 
framework in which governance was endogenous in the sense that the aid provider relies 
on disciplining measures to influence governance setting in recipient countries. However, 
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they did not empirically assess their assumption that disciplinary measures imposed by 
donors can improve public governance in recipient countries.  
As illustrated by the studies reviewed above, the existing literature on aid 
effectiveness overlooked the possibility that policy-based development assistance such as 
budget support could generate an overall government spending efficiency (improved 
public governance) that may result in improved aid effectiveness. This mediation role of 
public governance through public expenditure efficiency could provide insights on the 
appropriateness of budget support as a means to respond to donors’ concern that is to 
associate need and governance in aid delivery (Collier, 2007).  
Government spending efficiency as a measure of public governance is an 
indicator of the quality of policy and institutions. Public expenditures efficiency can 
indicate institutional quality changes that aid generates. As Hyman (2014) noted, 
governments intervene with domestic markets to mobilize resources and use them to 
produce public goods and services. Unlike with market-based allocations, political rules 
such as parliament votes, or executive orders determine the production of public goods 
through public policymaking and budgeting processes. According to Hyman (2014), a 
primary concern regarding social welfare improvement is therefore to make government 
interventions for resource allocation efficient. 
If donors should use aid to advance sound policies and democratic governance, 
assistance should result in promoting values underlining democracy and good 
policymaking, one of these being the efficient allocation of resources for improved 
collective wellbeing. According to Edwards (2015), a normative view of aid policy and 
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practices some academics and policymakers have defended is that aid is relevant to help 
advance both public governance and development. It implies that, donors can allocate aid 
to countries with weak governance which also appear to be the poorest. Aid is an entry 
point donor can use to establish policy dialogue with aid recipients in order to influence 
public governance in the most poorly governed countries. Acemoglu et al. (2014) have 
demonstrated that there is a correlation (if not causality) between quality institutions and 
sound policies and economic development. By using aid to promote good governance in 
aid recipient countries, donors can sustain development which is the main aid outcome. 
Whether budget support as an aid modality improves public institutions and policies in 
the least developed countries is the central concern of this dissertation. 
The subregion of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)), 
composed of eight countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Togo) sharing a common currency is used in this case study. 
According to the West Africa Central Bank (2016), , WAEMU has benefited from a 
sustained influx of budget support since 1995. Between 2000 and 2015, the eight 
countries together attracted a total of XOF 6493 billion of ODA in the form of budget 
support. This amount represents 6% of total government revenues, 26% of the public 
deficit, and 42% of total grant aid received by countries during the period. This study is 
an empirical analysis of the conditions of this budgetary support WAEMU benefited from 
to indicate the extent to which this budget support was an incentive to strengthen public 




In the context of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, promoting useful aid 
is a concern for donors. At the same time, the role of incentives in recipient countries has 
become central to the donors’ quest for aid effectiveness, and many donors consider 
ODA as a means to promote right policies and institutional qualities. This is illustrated by 
the formulation of budget support by the OECD-DAC members as a new policy-based 
aid modality and its increasing use by many OECD-DAC members since 2000. 
Donors’ expectation that increasing use of budget support makes aid more 
effective implies that the practice of budget support should relate to good public 
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. Donors expect that aid 
delivered through budget support generates better payoffs than if they offered this 
assistance through project aid or other aid modalities. A government that benefits from 
budget support should spend public revenues including development aid more efficiently 
than a state that does not or mainly relies on project aid. Intuitively, one could expect that 
the higher the share of budget support of total ODA from which a government benefits, 
the more efficient this government should be in delivering public services, since budget 
support should reward sound public policies and appropriate governance settings. 
Bourguignon and Platteau (2013) said that increased aid availability can result in aid 
ineffectiveness, due to decreasing productivity margin of aid amount. However, 
according to the World Bank (2006), budget support could increase the volatility of aid 
flows, raise fiduciary risks, increase transaction costs in the short term, and reduce 
incentives for public administration departments to advance reforms in sectoral policy 
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areas. Quibria (2014) noted that aid recipient countries could abnegate the 
implementation of the budget support policy reform agenda once they benefited from 
disbursements. The actual efficiency gain or loss that budget support may generate is 
therefore unclear. 
There is little scholarly empirical analysis of the relationship between budget 
support and public governance in recipient countries, in particular WAEMU countries. 
Existing studies do not address specific causal relationships between budget support and 
the Paris Declaration principles they had in focus. These studies did not address the 
efficiency of public service delivery that budget support effectiveness implicitly suggests.  
The exploration of the extent to which budget support is successful or not in 
improving the efficiency of delivering public services in aid recipient countries may 
result in new insights into conditions involving aid effectiveness. Therefore, the focus of 
this research will be to explore relationships between budget support and public 
expenditure efficiency in the WAEMU as a new step in understanding the extent to which 
budget support can help promote good governance for enhanced aid effectiveness. 
Theoretical Framework 
The aid effectiveness theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell 
’Ariccia inspired this research. Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia (2007) assume that aid 
effectiveness depends on developmental preferences and priorities of the aid recipient. 
They developed an analytical framework to determine the optimal choice between two 
aid modalities, which are budget support and project aid, based on the developmental 
preferences aid recipients displayed. They demonstrated that budget support is the 
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optimal choice for donors when total ODA is relatively low compared to the recipient’s 
resources and in situations where the recipient has a strong developmental preference. 
Project assistance is preferable to budget support for large-scale programs and when the 
preferences of donors and recipients are misaligned. 
Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory indicates that aid fungibility 
depends on the capacity of the aid recipient to substitute its domestic resources for aid. 
When project aid is relatively low compared to the recipient’s domestic resources, or the 
recipient’s developmental preference is high, the aid recipient can reallocate its resources 
away from the aid-funded project. If, conversely, the project aid is large enough, the aid 
recipient should have enough domestic resources or high development preference to be 
able to carry out a reallocation equivalent to the aid amount. Regarding budget support, 
the aid recipient can operate aid fungibility whatever the aid amount it benefits from and 
depending on its developmental preferences. 
The second issue Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory indicates is 
the role of good governance in aid effectiveness. Aid recipient’s developmental 
preferences can refer to the policy environment, hence the underlying institutional quality 
necessary for budget support to be effective. Since the donor’s choice of aid modality 
depends on the recipient’s developmental preference, the optimal choice of aid modality 
by a donor to ensure aid effectiveness is, therefore, highly dependent on the quality of 
governance in the aid recipient country. 
Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s aid effectiveness theory makes it possible to 
empirically investigate practices involving budget support, notably its association with 
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quality of governance in WAEMU countries. With the budget support aid modality, the 
aid recipient government spend the aid amount using its own policies and rules.  Policy 
conditions are meant to improve institutions, policies and rules in aid recipient countries 
to ensure that the aid amount provided by the donor is used efficiently by the recipient for 
enhanced development outcomes. Koeberle, Stavreski and Walliser (2006) indicated that 
budget support “is typically based on an agreed set of performance indicators in the form 
of institutional or policy reform measures or outcome indicators” (p. 6). Since WAEMU 
countries benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015, these countries can 
serve to assess the conditions under which donors delivered this support by analyzing 
associations between the practice of budget support and quality of public spending in 
these countries.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research is to quantitatively examine relationships between 
budget support and public governance, measured in terms of public expenditure 
efficiency for aid recipient countries in the WAEMU. The study will describe the 
importance of ODA and budget support in particular in the WAEMU region and 
elucidate the magnitude of changes in public expenditures that budget support generated. 
It will further explain causal relationships between budget support and government 
spending efficiency, by using control variables to ensure other potential factors 
contributing to public expenditure efficiency are incorporated in the analysis.  
The research also includes methodological contributions to the analysis of budget 
support effectiveness with a specific application to WAEMU countries. The research 
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used public expenditure efficiency that measures by relating human development 
composite index to public expenditures in WAEMU countries. The human development 
composite index combines three outcome measures which are economic development, 
education, and health. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study will provide answers to the following research questions along with 
related hypotheses. 
    RQ1: Is there a relationship between the use of budget support by donors in 
WAEMU countries over time and quality of their public governance? 
H01: There is no relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU 
countries over time and quality of public governance. 
Ha1: There is a relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU 
countries over time and quality of public governance.  
RQ2: Is there a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support 
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of service delivery? 
H02: There is no relationship between the absolute amount of budget support 
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery. 
Ha2: There is a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support 
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery.  
RQ3: Is there a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support in 
terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of public governance? 
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H03: There is no relationship over time between the proportion of budget support 
in terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of public governance. 
Ha3: There is a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support in 
terms of total aid in WAEMU countries and quality of governance.  
RQ4: Is there a relationship over time between the share of budget support 
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of public 
governance? 
H04: There is no relationship over time between the share of budget support 
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of their 
public governance. 
Ha4: There is a relationship over time between the share of budget support 
amount in terms of total government revenue in WAEMU countries and quality of their 
public governance. 
RQ5: Does initial level of institutional quality affect the prediction of the quality 
of public governance by budget support?   
H05: Initial level of institutional quality does not affect prediction of quality of 
public governance by budget support.  
Ha5: Initial level of institutional quality affect the prediction of the quality of 
public governance by budget support. 
RQ6: Does political context measured in terms of level of democratization affect 
the prediction of the quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public 
expenditures, by budget support in WAEMU countries over time? 
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H06: Political context measured in terms of level of democratization does not 
affect the prediction of the quality of public governance by budget support in WAEMU 
countries. 
Ha6: Political context measured in terms of level of democratization affects the 
prediction of the quality of public governance by budget support in WAEMU countries. 
Nature of the Study 
The study is quantitative and will use a quasi-experimental design to respond to 
the central research question: to understand the extent to which changes in budget support 
results in changes in institutional quality, measured by public expenditure efficiency in 
WAEMU countries. According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), there is both a 
correlational and causal dimension in quasi-experimental.  design, I used to examine the 
extent to which variations in budget support policy predict changes in public expenditure 
efficiency in WAEMU countries.  
Government spending efficiency (GSE) is the measure of public governance 
quality used as the dependent variable in this study. GSE will be estimated using 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). A measure of human development will be related to 
measures of gross domestic product, public expenditures, macroeconomic stability, and 
measures of population and density. The results of the SFA will be GSE scores for each 
of the WAEMU countries over 1995-2015.  
Budget support variables used in this study are budget support dummy, budget 
support absolute amount, the proportions of budget support in terms of total a country 
receives and total government revenues in each of the WAEMU countries.  Effects of 
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budget support on public governance quality will be studied in terms of relationships 
between budget support variables and GSE scores. The test of the hypotheses regarding 
relationships between budget support variables and GSE scores will consist of regressing 
GSE scores against budget support variables using panel data regression involving both 
fixed and random-effects models. Panel regressions will also be used to test for mediation 
and moderation of selected variables like initial level of public governance quality, and 
political context in terms of democratization and political stability in relation to 
efficiency. The introduction in the panel regressions of covariates (macroeconomic 
stability, corruption, development level) that may influence institutional quality measured 
by public expenditure efficiency, along with the primary explanatory variables of budget 
support policy, will control for potential confounding factors in explaining public 
expenditures efficiency. This procedure of using covariates in panel regressions will 
result in an explanatory design for an examination of the likelihood of a causal 
relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU 
countries.  
Definitions  
Aid: Foreign support that developing countries receive from other institutions to 
sustain the implementation of their development agendas (OECD, 2005). There are 
various ways of delivering aid including project and program aid, policy-based financing, 
and budget support. 
Aid modality: The policy or strategy that a donor uses to deliver aid to recipients. 
There are two main aid modalities which are project aid and budget support.  
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Budget support: is an aid modality that consists of transferring financial resources 
directly into recipients’ public budgets to support a medium-term program (Hayman, 
2011).  
Conditionality:  incentive measures (positive and negative) the aid provider 
donor, and the aid recipient agree upon within the framework of an aid contract (Koch, 
2015). 
Public governance: Institutional arrangements that frame public decision making 
and actions (United Nations, 2007). According to the OECD (2011), the principal 
elements of public governance are accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, 
responsiveness, and rule of law.   
Public expenditure efficiency: The capacity of a government to allocate or spend 
available resources in such a way that there is no possibility to improve an individual’s 
wellbeing without deteriorating another’s situation in the given constituency (Hyman, 
2014).  
Assumptions 
The overall assumption behind this study was that any amount of aid delivered 
through budget support indicates the donor’s intention to influence governance set in the 
recipient countries. As underlined earlier, donors use budget support to improve aid 
effectiveness by inciting aid recipients to improve their institutions and policies. It is also 
assumed that any disbursement made by a donor within budget support framework is an 
indication of an agreement between the donor and the recipient to implement various 
policy reforms in the recipient country in terms of public governance quality. This 
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assumption means that ceteris paribus, an additional unit of aid amount delivered through 
budget support is also a proxy of other policy inputs the aid recipient government 
commits to implement in performing public service. There is no distinction between 
sectoral and general budget support in this study. 
The assumption behind the choice of government spending efficiency as the 
dependent variable was that the primary objective of improving governance setting in 
recipient countries is to ensure that they spend public revenues in a well-organized 
manner. The role of a responsible and accountable government in a modern democratic 
society is to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently for collective wellbeing. The 
idea that donors can influence the emergence of responsible governments through budget 
support in recipient countries translates the use of disciplining measures by donors to 
incite aid recipient governments to allocate and spend public resources including 
development assistance efficiently. As an implication, it was also assumed that aid 
recipients spend budget support amount in the same manner they spend total government 
revenues, in line with the principle of fungibility.  
Scope and Delimitations 
This study focuses on the role of public governance quality on aid effectiveness. 
The focus of the study was about budget support as a specific aid modality. Donors 
design budget support to influence quality of institutions in aid recipient countries. The 
hypotheses of the study will be tested on the West Africa Economy and Monetary Union. 
This currency area has regional rules and policies to harmonize public finance data. 
Finally, the study covered budgets in these countries between 1995 and 2015. Since 2015, 
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methodological changes were introduced in the preparation of public budgets in 
WAEMU. Available budget data from 2015 might not be comparable to 1995-2015 data. 
Limitations 
The study used public expenditure efficiency coefficient of which estimate was 
based on a policy outcome index that synthesizes human development indicators such as 
economic development level, health and education conditions. By participating in the 
adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 by the United Nations and the MDGs in 
2002, which aimed to orient aid delivery, WAEMU countries committed to advance 
human wellbeing as their primary development objectives over the period of study. 
However, in practice, aid recipients like WAEMU countries may have developmental and 
non-developmental preferences. WAEMU countries might allocate their resources to 
unproductive programs. They could also implement policies which cause harm instead of 
advancing human development. 
Additionally, a limitation of the study is its geographical restriction that may 
affect the generalizability of the findings. Since the WAEMU is a currency zone, this 
may have some influences on the results. Therefore, the results of the study might not be 
generalizable to countries which do not have the common or harmonized fiscal, monetary 
and foreign exchange policies as those required in a monetary union. 
Significance 
This research will contribute to literature regarding aid effectiveness and the 
efficacy of budget support as a form of aid modality. This research involves time series 
cross sectional design and will provide new cross-country insights regarding the use of 
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budget support by donors as an efficient aid form. The study could improve donors’ 
knowledge of whether countries with more performant governance systems measured by 
their GSE coefficients are those that benefit from budget support and whether countries 
that receive budget support strengthen their systems in terms of efficient public service 
delivery. Therefore, donors may get new insights to better orient practices involving 
budget support and decide whether and when they could be confident in the governance 
setting in aid recipient countries to adequately substitute project aid for budget support. 
Therefore, the study may contribute to social change by explaining possibilities for 
donors to allocate more ODA through budget support in respect to one of the implications 
of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness, which requires donors to deliver ODA 
through recipient countries’ systems. 
This research may lead to a better understanding of the actual outcome in terms of 
institutional quality of donors’ immersion into aid recipient’s policy environments. This 
research may provide indications regarding whether motives of all stakeholders involved 
in public policymaking in recipient countries result in expected efficiency gains in terms of 
public service delivery in recipient countries.  
By using human development index to measure the public expenditure efficiency 
coefficient that serves as the dependent variable, the study implicitly informs 
policymakers in aid recipient countries and external donors regarding the relevance of 
using budget support to achieve social outcomes such as recently adopted sustainable 
development goals (SDGs). A useful implication of the study would be to explain 
whether donors can rely on budget support as a tool for need-governance tradeoff in 
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delivering aid. Donors can be confident in providing more resources through budget 
support to the neediest countries which are also the worst governed. 
Summary 
There are controversies on aid effectiveness amongst public policymakers and 
academics. An important topic in recent literature on aid effectiveness has been the 
possible influential role of aid in improving public governance n recipient countries. 
There is an opposition between scholars who claim the institutional perils and policy-
neutrality of ODA and optimists who perceive aid as a means to promote right policies 
and institutions in aid recipient countries. The optimistic view seems to have influenced 
many donors in designing and implementing new policy-based instruments such as 
budget support to deliver aid.Yet existing limited academic literature on budget support 
offers an incomplete view of the effectiveness of budget support in promoting 
institutional quality and better aid effectiveness. This study will contribute to assessments 
of the relationship between aid and governance, with an emphasis on budget support and 
governance in WAEMU countries. It is a scholarly attempt to search for improved aid 
outcomes through assessments of aid-driven institutional quality. The research may 
therefore provide insights regarding possibilities for donors and aid recipients to use 
budget support as an aid delivery modality to promote positive social change through 
improved public governance in aid recipient countries.  
In Chapter 2, there will be a review of existing literature on aid effectiveness, 
beginning with a brief description of the origin of aid and its evolution. The chapter will 
cover recent studies that emphasized relationships between foreign support and 
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governance to allow the identification of theoretical grounds in terms of how and to what 
extent aid can affect institutions and policies in recipient countries. The aid effectiveness 
theoretical framework developed by Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia, will frame this study. 
There will be a discussion of the state of recent research on budget support effectiveness 
and implications for this study. Finally, the literature review will link aid effectiveness 
with selected public administration theories namely institutional analysis and 
development framework, innovation and diffusion model and transaction cost approach 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In the existing literature, scholars have investigated the role of governance and 
institutional quality regarding aid effectiveness in two main directions. In the first 
approach, institutional settings in potential aid recipient countries were considered 
exogenous, and donors chose aid recipient based on their apparent merit of public 
governance quality or politics. In the second approach, institutions in recipient countries 
were endogenous. Donors can impose disciplinary measures or conditionalities to 
improve institutional quality in recipient countries resulting in reinforced aid outcomes.  
The theoretical framework for this research is the aid effectiveness theory 
developed by Cordello and Dell’ Ariccia. This framework involves assessing how aid 
allocation generates incentives for aid effectiveness. With this theoretical foundation, the 
study considers the potential of budget support to stimulate positive institutional change 
and appropriate policy reforms. Guided by the theoretical foundation, the literature 
review will illustrate two dimensions of institutional quality before explaining 
specificities of budget support. In the last section of the literature review, the relationship 
between the aid effectiveness theory and practice and selected public administration 
theories is reviewed to discuss research questions and hypotheses.  
Literature Assessment Approach 
The first step in the literature review involved a database search on aid 
effectiveness. Political Science Complete, Academic Search Complete, Policy Studies 
Journal, SAGE, and JSTOR were used to get an overview of scholarly studies from 2011 
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through to 2016. Search phrases were aid theory, official development assistance theory, 
development aid effectiveness, development assistance effectiveness, foreign aid 
effectiveness, budget support effectiveness, program aid effectiveness, public 
expenditures efficiency, government spending efficiency, aid effectiveness politics, aid 
economics, political economics of aid effectiveness, aid and institutions, aid and 
governance, aid and Africa, aid and West Africa, Aid and WAEMU, budget support and 
Africa, budget support and West Africa, budget support and WAEMU, program aid and 
Africa, program aid and West Africa, program aid and WAEMU. Scholarly studies on 
politics of aid effectiveness were obtained from SAGE, Academic Search Complete, 
Policy Studies Journal and Political Science. Results of search in JSTOR were scholarly 
studies on economics and political economics of aid effectiveness, institutions and 
governance, methodological aspects of institutional quality and efficiency.   
Furthermore, studies identified through various searches were used to deepen the 
literature review as they made it possible to locate complementary academic works which 
were relevant to the investigation. There were also books involving ODA, public policy 
and finance, public administration, and quantitative research. Reports from various 
international organizations such as the OECD, World Bank, and United Nations, which 
play a significant role in shaping ODA, were consulted. The literature review also 
included reports and studies on the WAEMU. A literature review matrix was used to 
summarize the content of studies. 
The following subsection of the literature review is a review of the theoretical 
foundation of the study. The next section is an analysis of the role of institutional quality 
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in promoting aid effectiveness. Since budget support is an aid modality, this section is 
used to analyze the possibility that other policy inputs such as quality public service 
delivery and politics increase aid outcomes at a given level of aid amount. The 
mechanisms by which budget support as a specific aid modality can result in improved 
aid outcomes constitutes the main content of discussions in the budget support and 
institutions subsection. In this subsection, main characteristics of budget support are 
investigated with regard to interrelations with institutional quality both theoretically and 
empirically. Theories involving public administration are further reviewed in the 
subsection on budget support effectiveness and public administration to analyze the 
complexity of institutional mechanisms that the practice of budget support can lead to. To 
my knowledge, there are few empirical studies which related public administration 
theories to budget support effectiveness.   
Aid Effectiveness Theoretical Foundation 
In the existing literature on aid effectiveness, scholars investigated aid 
effectiveness from the perspective of the recipient's policy environment. In this regard, 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) 's seminal work gave new impetus to the debate on the role of 
the beneficiary's governance setting on aid efficiency. Researchers were also concerned 
with how aid allocation, in conjunction with the policy environments of both the donor 
and the recipient, can affect aid effectiveness. This discussion was mostly empirical until 
the release of Cordello and Dell' Ariccia 's influential paper. In this article, Cordello and 
Dell' Ariccia (2007) analyzed budget support and project modalities separately. The aid 
recipient can allocate its resources on development and nondevelopment priorities. The 
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donor prefers the beneficiary prioritizes production of developmental goods but can only 
partially observe the recipient’s developmental preferences through capital expenditure. 
Cordello and Dell’Ariccia (2007) said that budget support can result in increased 
developmental goods if the donor imposes conditionality on the observable recipient’s 
developmental preferences which is measured by the proportion of capital expenditures 
in total government revenues. However, this conditionality will generate inefficiencies in 
terms of the way the aid recipient allocates resources between developmental and 
nondevelopment priorities. Conditional budget support is preferable to project aid in 
terms of development production when the granted assistance is relatively low compared 
to the beneficiary’s resources. Budget support also dominates project aid in terms of 
development effectiveness when the aid recipient’s developmental preference is high.  
In Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s model, developmental preference was a proxy of 
policy and institutional environment in the aid recipient country. Cordello and 
Dell’Ariccia explain how policy and institutional environment affect the choice of donors 
willing to improve aid outcomes with the choice of aid modality. By imposing 
conditionality on capital expenditures, a donor can influence budget allocations in the 
budget support recipient country with the view to improve aid outcomes. Cordello and 
Dell' Ariccia did not, however, analyze the combination of the two aid modalities which 
are budget support and project aid. The two aid modalities were discussed separately in 
their theoretical framework. Conditions for the effectiveness of the imposed 
conditionality on capital expenditure was not explained.  
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Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008) extended Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s model to 
integrate budget support and project aid in a unique theoretical model and assess the 
conditions under which budget support conditionality of is optimal.  Jelovac and 
Vandeninden argue that unconditional budget support is the optimal choice a donor can 
make to ensure aid effectiveness. The use of conditionality by a donor is optimal when 
there is an alignment between the preferences of the donor and the beneficiary, and the 
productivity of the other policy inputs as well as the proportion of aid compared to the 
beneficiary’s resources are high. Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s theoretical model extended 
by Jelovac and Vandeninden indicate when and how a donor can prefer budget support to 
project aid. But both Cordello and Dell’Ariccia and Jelovac and Vandeninden did not 
explain why in practice, as in WAEMU countries, the two aid modalities are used 
simultaneously by donors for the same country. Furthermore, If donors are concerned 
with aligning their preferences with those of aid recipients, several countries among the 
neediest, including those in the WAEMU, would be ex-ante excluded from aid allocation 
because of their weak public governance.  
Mounir (2015) has developed a theoretical model in which the donor can allocate 
aid by interplaying on the two aid modalities, considering the information asymmetry 
concerning the recipient's preferences. The proportion of aid that benefits poor indicates 
the recipient's developmental behavior. The donor does not know in advance how much 
assistance the recipient will allocate to the poor due to asymmetric information. Mounir 
explains that donors should use budget support to allocate aid to governments who 
demonstrate a weak propensity to redistribute national income to poor. Donors can also 
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use pooling aid that combines budget support and project aid as an optimal choice to 
create positive incentives when the recipient has a weak propensity to redistribute income 
to poor. With the pooled fund, a donor can use both exogenous selection of aid recipient 
and endogenous influence on the aid recipient’s developmental preferences for aid 
allocation to avoid excluding systematically the neediest countries. In this line, 
Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) revisited aid effectiveness and examine how aid 
availability affects aid effectiveness.  Bourguignon and Platteau consider various 
possibilities and implications for an aid agency that is willing to optimize its utility 
function in allocating aid between two countries considering need and governance. Aid 
effectiveness decreases with aid project size as leaders tend to reduce efforts or embezzle 
a higher share of aid money. Whether the donor imposes disciplining measures or not on 
poorly governed country, the availability of increased aid amount leads the donor to 
include both wealthy and poorly governed countries in the development aid program. 
However, the donor is likely to focus on better governed and wealthy nations when the 
available aid amount is smaller, and public governance quality is very weak in other 
countries compared to wealthy countries. These results imply that donors consider a 
need-governance trade-off to promote inclusive aid programs where worst governed and 
most impoverished nations would benefit from aid allocation in addition to better-
governed countries. Bourguignon and Platteau also suggest that when the available aid 
amount to the donor is small, poorest countries should reach a minimum level of public 
governance quality to benefit from aid allocation. This indicates that aid can be useful in 
the neediest countries if it results in improved public governance quality in these 
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countries. An alternative for the donor could be to accept in the short term a level of aid 
ineffectiveness while using disciplining measures to raise public governance quality to 
the minimum required level in the poorest countries. While Bourguignon and Platteau did 
not empirically test their analytical solutions, Dutta, Leeson, and Wiliamson (2013)’s 
quantitative empirical analysis suggested that the need-governance trade-off the donor 
decides depends on the existing political setting in the aid recipient country. 
Development aid makes dictatorships more dictatorial and democracies more democratic. 
It means that foreign assistance does not change political institutions but amplify them. 
There is thus an exaggeration of the effect of aid on political institutions although these 
findings imply that development aid for democratizing dictatorships may cause harm as it 
can strengthen dictatorships. At the same time, an attractive political implication is that 
aid can strengthen democracies in weakly democratic countries, and thus an inclusive aid 
allocation is possible, as Bourguignon and Platteau suggested with their need-governance 
analytical framework.  
Optimistic scholars who claim aid usefulness and pessimistic academics who 
defend aid ineffectiveness are reconciled with the role of institutional quality regarding 
aid effectiveness in aid recipient countries. The optimistic view is adopted for this 
dissertation. It is inspired by Cordello and Dell’Ariccia’s theoretical suggestion that there 
may be a possibility to appropriately design and deliver aid in such a way that it 
positively influences public governance quality through knowledge sharing and improve 
legislative, executive and judiciary branches of democratic governments. Donors can use 
aid to strengthen civil society and free press, the rule of law and limit corruption in such a 
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way that aid fungibility is not associated with aid ineffectiveness. This is supported by 
Morrissey (2015) who argue that there is an over-estimation of aid fungibility whereas 
this latter did not reduce aid effectiveness. Donors like the OECD-DAC members have 
been using budget support to promote institutional setting that ensures right policies and 
institutions for increased aid effectiveness.  
Aid Effectiveness, Institutions, and Policies 
Originally, aid had an economic meaning as aid providers used it to sustain 
economic development in the aid recipient countries. Aid effectiveness had little to do 
with politics and institutions as it was made available for financing public investments, 
which determine economic growth. According to Edwards (2015), development aid 
emerged as an implication of the Harrod-Domar’s economic growth model. In this model, 
investment and thus savings is the key ingredient development planners have to sustain 
economic growth over long term. Development planners used Harrod-Domar’s economic 
growth model to estimate the investment gap that a central government should mobilize 
to attain an economic performance objective. Hence, in a context of insufficient domestic 
savings, a government can look for external funds such as foreign aid to achieve the 
planned investment level. This was illustrated by the Marshall Plan, where the United 
States of America earmarked funds to help rebuild Western Europe in the aftermath of 
the second world war. The American support, which included both loans and grants, 
compensated to some extent the destruction of capital that had occurred during the war. 
The protagonist blocs that were fighting and the neutral countries benefited from the 
American aid. Population and industrial powers were part of the criteria used to allocate 
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the American support to the various beneficiary countries, although the Allies members 
benefited from a more significant share than the Axis countries. 
The main aid outcome is thus economic growth, which also measures 
development. Since saving generates economic growth, aid is therefore effective if it 
compensates the shortage of savings in the recipient countries. A rich literature has 
investigated both the correlation and causality between development aid and economic 
growth. For instance, Limodio (2012) examined the relationship between aid and 
economic growth through capital accumulation process and found that aid had a limited 
contribution to economic growth. In fact, the transmission mechanism through which aid 
can predict economic growth seems to be a puzzle of direct and indirect effects. Tezanos, 
Quinones and Guijarro (2013) investigated this puzzle by adjusting economic growth 
with economic inequality and found that aid was effective in terms of promoting 
inequality-adjusted economic growth. Kalyvitis, Stengos and Vlachaki (2012) re-
examined the relationship between aid and economic growth with the introduction of a 
threshold effect. Their econometric analysis on 42 countries (40% were African countries 
including WAEMU countries) over 1970-2000 suggests the existence of a threshold from 
which aid has a significant positive effect on economic growth. The authors argued that a 
minimum aid of around 3.4% of GDP is necessary to break up the vicious circle of low 
savings-low growth-high poverty in developing countries. Kalyvitis, Stengos and 
Vlachaki confirm Rostow (1960)’s development theory which suggests that low-income 
countries needed a big push like the Marshall Plan to stimulate a sustained economic 
development dynamic. These results are illustrative of controversial findings on the 
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relationship between aid and aid outcome defined by economic growth. They also 
exemplify the idea that economic growth and investment-saving gap mechanisms are not 
enough to assess and understand aid effectiveness.  
As economic theory evolved, the use of aid encompassed larger items than saving, 
to cover inter alia human capital, technology and research and development. Using a 
historical perspective, Edwards (2015) argued that economic developments have 
influenced aid policy and practices. Donors progressively moved from the need to close 
the investment gap to the funding of skills and technology in the advent of Solow’s 
economic development theory in the 1980s that considers technological progress as the 
engine of long-term economic growth. Tezanos, Quinones & Guijarro (2013) investigated 
the contribution of development aid to human capital and total factor productivity as 
means to sustain economic growth. Most recent scholar papers on aid effectiveness used 
the endogenous economic growth theoretical framework, which emphasizes total factor 
productivity as critical in promoting sustained economic growth in addition to physical 
capital. Other factors Tezanos, Quinones & Guijarro stressed include innovation, human 
capital, social capital and institutions. The emergence of conditionalities donors imposed 
to aid beneficiaries introduced the role of institutions to improve aid effectiveness by 
building economic institutions and conducting appropriate reforms to sustain aid 
outcomes. The financial allocations criteria and the inclusive aid allocation in the 
Marshall Plan, despite the American non-neutral positioning during the war, are 
illustrative of this politics-free aid reasoning, while considering the role of institutions. 
Conditionalities were in line with dominant economic theory which involves open 
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markets, private ownership rights, and the limited role of the State in the economy. These 
elements were included in the structural adjustment programs and the Washington 
Consensus programs the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund supported by 
OECD countries obliged many developing countries to implement. Since economic 
institution building mainly relies on government’s commitment and ownership in 
beneficiary countries, a participatory approach to conditioned-aid further nurtured aid 
policies and debates. Beneficiary countries should therefore be in the driver’s seat to lead 
and coordinate reforms and policies jointly defined with donors for aid effectiveness. 
According to Edwards (2011), Through these programs, recipient countries should 
undertake necessary economic reforms to strengthen market economy. Aid effectiveness 
is thus implicitly conditioned by the functioning of the market institution. Development 
aid should thus obey the logic of the efficient allocation of resources. 
The politics-free aid line gives only a partial view of aid practice since the 
political economy plays a crucial role in the way aid generates expected development 
outcomes. It overlooks the imbrication between economic and political institutions in aid 
delivery and outcomes. Booth (2011) undertook a review of the recent literature on 
development aid and explained that institutions rule played a critical role in economic 
development in terms of increases of per capita growth and was a driver of the volume of 
aid received. While there is no clear-cut understanding of what the right institution is, it is 
known to be a function of politics and therefore politics influences aid effectiveness. One 
implication from this development is that aid is unlikely to generate positive effects 
without appropriate institutions and policies Williams & Copestake (2014) argued that 
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development assistance should therefore be context-specific and target countries that 
have the proper governance setting for its effectiveness.  
Donors were encouraged in the aid allocation selectivity requirement that 
countries that demonstrate good governance and quality institutions deserve foreign 
assistance. Donors have then used the existence and level of democratic governance and 
systems to select aid recipients. Winters and Martinez (2015) performed linear 
regressions and statistical compositional analysis covering 121 countries including most 
African countries and argue that poorly governed countries receive fewer aid flows. 
Donors’ preferences regarding aid modalities and sector allocations are a function of the 
beneficiary’s governance performance. Donors used programmatic aids in better-
governed countries while they preferred project aid in social sectors in poorly governed 
countries. Nordveit (2014) also emphasized donors’ tendency to adapt aid modality to 
governance quality level in recipient countries by computing the probability that 23 
bilateral aid providers use budget support in 115 countries including 47 African countries 
and 8 WAEMU countries. Donors were likely to use budget support in better-governed 
countries. The latter were also likely to benefit from higher shares of budget support. 
Clist, Isopi and Morissey (2012) applied a contract-based theoretical framework to 88 
recipients including 32 African countries (7 WAEMU countries were covered) and found 
that there was no significant relationship between the amount of budget support and 
government effectiveness, even though government effectiveness predicts the use of 
budget support by donors.  
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There are limitations to the robustness of these findings that purported that aid 
providers mostly target less-corrupted or better-governed countries in aid allocation. An 
illustration is the significant variations in findings about explanatory variables, coverage 
and period the authors input in their models. Akramov (2012) noted that the 
discrimination between aid recipients was more perceptible when governance gaps were 
significant. By using the Freedom House scores as the predictor for 112 countries 
including 47 African countries and 7 WAEMU countries, Akramov found that only 
changes between categories significantly correlated with aid allocation, while slight 
changes within categories were less associated to aid allocation. Another issue was the 
heterogeneity between donors in the way they expressed governance-based selectivity 
since their behaviors were also a function of other variables. Masaki (2016) illustrated 
this issue using panel data of 478 coups (including in Africa and WAEMU countries) and 
noted that donors sanctioned democratic regressions by reducing aid disbursements in the 
advent of coup d’état mainly after the cold war. However, this result did not hold during 
the cold war. Reactions to coups were also not uniform across bilateral donors as 
countries such as the United States of America favored geostrategic determinants in their 
cooperation with developing countries. Masaki concluded that this heterogeneity was 
likely to weaken the effect of political conditionality on aid effectiveness. This is 
worrying given the heterogeneity between donors regarding rewarding democratic 
governance progress with foreign aid. Reinsberg (2015) conducted an econometric 
analysis based on 174 aid recipients including most African countries and WAEMU 
countries and found that bilateral donors rewarded political liberalization with increased 
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aid allocation liberalization while multilateral donors such as the World Bank did not. 
Donors’ selectivity and their ability to encourage good governance is thus a function of 
their own institutional constraints.  
Therefore, the issue of aid effectiveness becomes more complex as it depends on 
institutional settings in both donors and recipients’ countries.  Easterly (2014) elucidated 
the aid effectiveness complexity by arguing that aid was suffering double principal-agent 
problems as taxpayers in donors’ countries and ultimate beneficiaries in recipient 
countries were not involved in the aid decision making process. This complexity adds to 
the unclear accountability chains between governmental donors and recipients that also 
affect aid selectivity and its effectiveness. Easterly relies on this argument to justify that 
aid is ineffective as a significant share of aid flows go to the most corrupted governments. 
Brown and Swiss (2013) also raised this selectivity inconsistency by highlighting the 
difficulty of using public governance quality to discriminate between aid orphans and aid 
darlings. Many aid orphans were the neediest while public management in many aid 
darlings was far from rosy. Dreher, Nunnemkamp, and Thiele (2011) used Probit and 
Tobit models to confirm the selfishness and commercial self-interest of donors in 
allocating aid. Dreher, Nunnemkamp, and Thiele compared emerging donors and the 
OECD-DAC aid providers and argued that merit regarding better governed or less 
corrupted countries was not the primary motive of aid selectivity in either of the two 
groups. Also, the emerging donors displayed less concern with beneficiary needs than did 
the OECD-DAC donors, since explanatory variables such as income per capita, 
malnutrition or child mortality did not have a significant impact on aid allocation by 
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emerging donors. Easterly and Wiliamson (2011) and de la Croix and Delavallade (2013) 
also reached the same conclusions regarding inappropriate aid allocation. According to 
Easterly and Williamson (2011), aid is ineffective as donors have not adjusted to the 
evolution of corruption in the beneficiary countries. Donors have maintained the same 
level of support to countries that have become more corrupt over time. de la Croix and 
Delavallade (2013) argued that development aid inefficiency was a result of the low 
productivity in nations which benefited from more aid, these countries also being the 
most corrupt.  
The above analyses suffered various shortcomings. The studies were based on aid 
commitments and not disbursements. Amounts donors committed are sometimes not 
disbursed when countries fail to meet ex-ante defined conditions. Also, the focus of these 
studies on merit-based aid allocation raises a normative concern: Since governance 
predicts aids, nations in acute needs should benefit from less support as they are usually 
also the most poorly governed. Finally, these studies overlook the possibility that aid 
improves governance setting, and thus offers opportunities to advance governance in 
neediest countries.  
Donors have tried to address the challenge of assisting the neediest in poorly 
governed environments by bypassing state organizations. Detrich (2013) noted that 
donors were likely to rely on non-state actors and bypass states in poorly governed 
countries. The involvement of independent nonprofits in aid delivery is politically 
attractive to donors as it is meant to show the donors’ goodwill. Niskanen (1968) has 
formulated a theoretical framework of bureaucracy, which specifies that a rational 
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bureaucrat would support inefficiency by looking for increasing budget allocations to 
achieve a given objective. This suggests that the promotion of competition between 
bureaus for budget allocation will provide an incentive for efficiency. According to 
Ulbaek & Nohr, (2014), a viable approach government developed with the view to 
improve public service delivery is public nonprofit partnerships. Donors could expect 
improving aid effectiveness by creating competition between governmental bureaus and 
nonprofit organizations for aid allocation. 
However, this approach can result in fragmented and uncoordinated aid, which is 
also a source of inefficiency. According to Molenaers, Jacobs & Dellepiane (2013), 
fragmented aid through the intermediation of multiple Non-Governmental Organizations 
may be ineffective as Non-Governmental Organizations have their own motives, which 
may affect the way they deliver assistance to beneficiary countries. Further, 
uncoordinated assistance may generate significant transaction cost that affects aid 
effectiveness. Bigsten and Tengstam (2013) supported this idea by quantifying the 
potential benefit of aid coordination and noted that aid coordination through a focus on 
fewer countries and shift from project aid to program aid could generate significant gains 
in aid effectiveness. This benefit can outweigh transaction costs as well as the high 
political cost of aid coordination. Bigsten and Tengstam went further to suggest that an 
appropriate coordination can result in reallocating 50% of available aid from aid darlings 
to orphans with significant potential efficiency gains. However, the efficiency gain 
depends on the governance situation and donors can therefore not assure such a gain for 
certain reallocations, such as from aid darlings to lousy aid orphans. Bigsten and 
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Tengstam’s findings did not cover the possibility that donors influence governance in 
either of the aid orphan or darling countries. Also, it is not clear whether the size of the 
donor's club matters for the efficiency gains aid coordination can generate. There is also 
heterogeneity in donors’ behaviors which may suggest that the type of aid providers 
would influence the potential efficiency gains. If donors must assist the neediest while aid 
effectiveness is subject to institutional quality, donors need to influence governance 
quality in beneficiary countries. The endogeneity of aid allocation to improve governance 
setting in recipient countries was also the concerns of some scholars. Molenaers, 
Dellepiane, and Faust (2015) explained that political conditionality emerged in response 
to worries about the mediating effects of recipient politics and institutions on aid 
effectiveness. Aid has entered a new age of ex-post conditionality. In this sense, donors 
and policy makers perceived assistance as a tool to influence political changes and 
generate governance improvements. However, how governance and which aspects of 
public management mediate aid effectiveness is still unclear. The successful 
implementation of the right institutions through aid conditionality has been a subject of 
intense debates.  
Some scholars such as Asongu (2013) have used various analytical framework to 
argue against the institutional building propensity of aid. A critical theoretical argument 
built on the established resource curse theory to depict the institutional peril of aid in 
developing countries. Aid is perceived as a rent that follows the same logic of the natural 
resources curse. According to this political aid curse theory, foreign aid is detrimental to 
institutions, deteriorates accountability, encourages rent-seeking behaviors, generates 
40 
 
conflict for internal aid allocation, disincentives recipient governments regarding 
appropriate reforms, increases corruption, and undermines the rule of law. Using a panel 
design of 53 African countries Asongu (2013) suggested that foreign aid negatively and 
significantly affects various indicators of institutional quality for quintiles of institutional 
quality. With their foreign assistance, donors thus contribute to deteriorate the 
institutional quality irrespective of institutional development in recipient countries. Along 
the same lines, Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2012) said that aid did not encourage democratic 
accountability. Aid tends to release budgetary pressures on governments and weaken 
governmental accountability and citizens control. 
Other scholars like Jones and Tarp (2015) have defended the opposite view to the 
institutional perils of foreign aid. The theoretical foundation of these studies builds on the 
idea that aid is more conditional, less fungible and less reliable than oil revenues and 
should not result in political resource curse as natural resources. By using long-run cross-
sectional and panel designs, Jones and Tarp suggested a small but definite effect of aid on 
political institutions, arguing that aid may compensate the political cost to the leader of 
improving governance systems. Different aid modalities affect political systems in 
different ways. In this sense Jones and Tarp negated the theory of the institutional perils 
of aid and concluded there is no systemic adverse assistance effect on institutions. 
However, Jones and Tarp (2015) used a confusing concept of governance aid which 
included human rights, civil society, and institutional development. Their analyses 
considered commitments rather than disbursements. The study also lacks solid theoretical 
ground as the Jones and Tarp used agnostic stance and argued that there is no clear-cut 
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method of estimation in the literature. Altincekic and Bearce (2014) also reached the 
same conclusion of negating the institutional peril theory by quantitatively examining the 
relationship between aid to various repression and appeasement indicators and running 
causality tests. Altincekic and Bearce based their analyses on the rentier state theory 
formalized through repression and appeasement strategies and found no evidence of 
political foreign aid curse measured through repression and appeasement. Altincekic and 
Bearce suggested that there was no significant correlation between aid and tax burden, no 
statistically significant correlation between aid and education and health spending and no 
statistically significant association between military spending and aid in non-democracy 
sub-samples, but only in democracy sub-sample. In contrary to the political aid curse, 
Altincekic and Bearce illustrated aid blessing: assistance increases human rights in 
democracies but no effect in non-democracies, aid rises anti-government pressures, and 
development aid tends to increase the political change in democracies. These results 
confirm the idea that the democracy level may influence the effect of development aid on 
political institutions. However, the use of aggregate data that combines grants and highly 
concessional loans could have affected the results. I could suspect that a more constant 
and fungible aid may generate political resource curse unless the associated 
conditionalities force or incite governments for better management of public 
expenditures. Faye and Niehaus (2012) showed that the political alignment between the 
aid provider’s administration and recipient’s administration can play an incentive role. By 
comparing the volume of aid donors allocated during electoral years according to the 
political alignment of recipient’s administrations, Faye and Niehaus found a reallocation 
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of aid from less politically aligned administrations to more aligned administrations during 
competitive elections. This result suggested the existence of political aid cycle that may 
have adverse or positive effects on institutional quality in aid recipient countries. 
The institutional peril that aid engenders is unclear. Askarov and Doucouliagos 
(2013) nuanced the negation of the institutional peril of aid that seems to have emerged 
as dominant in the recent literature on development aid and governance. Askarov and 
Doucouliagos conducted a meta-analysis and suggested that development aid had no or 
zero effect on democracy but affects some parts of the word mainly some East European 
transitional economies moderately. The impact of development aid on governance was 
somewhat positive but depended on the time-period in terms of before and after post-
Cold War. These findings have various implications. They suggest that other factors can 
influence the effect of aid on governance and that there were no precise mechanisms on 
how development aid affects democracy and governance. The measure of development 
aid as well as democracy and governance matter for the research results. Askarov and 
Doucouliagos also confirmed that it is possible that development aid positively influences 
governance and promotes democracy if appropriately designed. Ravallion (2014) adopted 
the same posture from its literature review by arguing that the aid curse seems 
theoretically plausible but does not prove empirically. The aid curse appears to be 
contingent on various parameters including the social preferences of leaders, which are 
not well known, and the qualities of existing institutions. Even in the case of elite capture 
and fungibility, government consumption rather than investment can be beneficial to 
poor.  There was no clear evidence that aid stalls beneficiary efforts to mobilize domestic 
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revenues. Neither was there any robust finding that aid harms institutions. Conversely, 
with development aid, donors can push for politically costly reforms with long-term 
benefits and help to avoid a poor institution trap by forcing countries to a minimum 
threshold level. Therefore, it could be counterproductive to withdraw aid in the presence 
of corrupt governments. Ravallion also questioned the use of economic growth to enquire 
aid effectiveness as most aid targets social objectives. It emerged from these arguments 
that there is still room to investigate further many missing links including how the social 
preferences and constraints that leaders face affect aid management and its effectiveness. 
Ravallion shared this view and called for in-depth investigations of the dynamics of 
institutional development to how aid affects institutions and whether it is optimal and 
advisable to cut assistance for evil governments. 
Budget Support Effectiveness, Policies, and Governance 
  Budget support is an aid modality donors use to combine financial amount, policy 
dialogue between aid donors and recipients, technical assistance and a policy reforms 
agenda. In its conception, budget support synthetizes various means that donors have 
used sparingly to ensure aid effectiveness. Theoretically, by using budget support, donors 
can thus influence governance settings in recipient countries through various mechanisms 
to ensure enhanced aid outcomes.  
According to the World Bank (2010), which is a pioneer of this aid policy, budget 
support should promote country ownership, facilitate alignment of donors to recipients’ 
development agendas, favor harmonization between donors, and reduce transaction costs. 
Researchers studied the extent to which budget support has been successful in meeting 
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these general objectives and reached mixed conclusions. Based on a descriptive narrative, 
Tavakoly and Smith (2013) highlighted that budget support was effective in improving 
allocative efficiency and public finance management, but it did not reduce transaction 
costs and did not improve public service delivery. While Tavakoly and Smith did not 
define their meaning of allocative efficiency and transaction costs, their findings raised 
concerns about the possible efficiency gains that donors could expect from improved 
public service delivery. Selaya and Thiele (2012) studied the impact of budget support on 
bureaucracy which is one of the means to deliver and improve public service and 
explained that the impact of development assistance on bureaucratic quality depends on 
the degree of bureaucrat’s discretion in recipient countries. Selaya and Thiele argued that 
budget support hurts bureaucracy, as it offers a high degree of discretion to beneficiaries. 
While Selaya and Thiele did not clarify the mechanisms behind their suggestion finding, 
their result is in contradiction with the principle of country ownership that underlies 
budget support policy. As Ohemeng and Grant (2014) noted, If improved bureaucracy 
can boost the efficiency of public service delivery, Selaya and Thiele’s finding would 
indicate that budget support policy can weaken the efficiency of public service delivery 
as it can impair the functioning of bureaucracy.  
The source of improved allocative efficiency was also subject of concern, as the 
main objective of budget support and therefore the expected policy outcome seems 
varying from a donor to another. Swedlund (2013) investigated the country ownership 
objective and argued that budget support constituted a channel for donors’ influence on 
policymaking in recipient countries. Using a multiple-case study involving Rwanda and 
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Tanzania, Swedlund explained that donors used budget support to influence decision 
making in the two studied countries through voice amplification, a seat at the table, and a 
license to ask questions. While Swedlund did not prove the generalization of his results, 
his findings suggest that through these three channels of influence, donors may enforce 
directly sound policies such as those that enhance allocative efficiency, instead of 
impelling changes in institutional policy making setting. In this line, Anthunes et al. 
(2012) found no evidence of the effect of budget support on health spending. While this 
result based on econometric estimation focused on allocation spending to the health 
sector, it was useful in highlighting a possible effect of budget support on budget 
allocation. An evaluation carried out by the World Bank in 2010 also confirmed the 
ambiguousness of the relationship between budget support and policy outcomes, 
suggesting an insufficient understanding of the mechanisms that may relate budget 
support to policy outcomes.  
Donors use budget support as a political instrument, rather than a purely technical 
tool for promoting sound policies in recipient countries. Molenaers (2012) contended that 
there was a significant divide between donors regarding visions and practical orientations 
of budget support. The guidelines developed by the OECD (2012) and the World Bank 
(2010) emphasize the technocratic ground and dimension of budget support both 
regarding development and governance reforms. However, the budget support practice 
revealed that many donors diverted from these standards and tied their budget support to 
political conditionalities. These donors therefore still maintained their traditional views 
that aid should respond to political objectives such as the promotion of democracies in 
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recipient countries. In this context, since political conditionalities were reported to have 
ambiguous success in the literature, the actual impact of budget support on governance 
reforms such as public service delivery, quality and transparent public budget processes 
and cycles, and improved public financial management, is uncertain. Dijkstra (2012) used 
a case study based on document reviews and secondary data to analyze the 
implementation of budget support regarding pre-conditions, intermediary results, and 
policy outcomes. Dijkstra suggested budget support in Nicaragua was characterized a 
trade-off donors made between governance and poverty reduction objectives. As a result, 
budget support was not successful in generating policy outcomes such as reduced 
poverty; nor did it have a significant impact on public governance quality. If this finding 
were generalized, it would mean that budget support does not provide enough incentives 
for good policymaking that would be necessary to make development assistance useful. 
This implication would contradict the rationale that underlies budget support. Hayman 
(2011) also explored the democratic governance lens on budget support by investigating 
the relationship between budget support and democracy conditionality. Hayman argued 
that, while budget support was meant to be technically oriented, it has also been 
politically conditioned by donors, although there was little evidence that budget support 
was successful in fostering the expected democratic changes in recipient countries.  
The idea of investigating the inclusion of political conditionality such as 
democracy promotion within budget support framework builds on the relationship 
between democratic governance and development. As Biondo and Orbie (2014) 
discussed, there is conflicting evidence that democracy promotes development. 
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Therefore, it would be illusory to expect that budget support favors development 
outcomes through the promotion of democratic governance.  This imprecision may 
explain the shift of donors, such as the European Commission, from the extreme 
democracy promoter to the development promoter while maintaining public governance 
incentive tranches. Molenaers, Gagiano, Smets, and Dellepiane (2015) conducted and 
econometric analysis and found that donors relied on budget support to sanction 
democracy regress. Suspensions of disbursement by donors within the budget support 
framework were associated to downward trend in democracy functioning. However, the 
study falls short in explaining how democratic governance can influence the relationship 
between budget support and development outcomes. 
Budget Support Effectiveness and Public Administration 
It results from the review of the literature on aid effectiveness and budget support 
effectiveness that the first theoretical framework that can inform the assessment of the 
relationship between budget support and efficiency of public service delivery is the 
institutional analysis and development framework explained by Ostrom, Cox, and 
Schlarger (2014). This theory implies that policy process requires a trade-off between 
efficiency and other public or democratic values such as accountability and equity. 
Within the framework of budget support there are technical and implicit political 
conditionalities that require recipients’ countries to meet objectives such as equity or 
enhanced accountability through strengthened democratic governance (Molenaers, 2012). 
This requirement may force beneficiaries to trade public spending efficiency to meet 
imposed objectives. Therefore, this theoretical framework would suggest that budget 
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support could result in efficiency losses in public service delivery. This assumption will 
confirm to some extent the institutional peril of aid.  
However, an examination of the budget support practice through the innovation 
and diffusion model theory as it resulted from Okada and Samreth (2012) would result in 
objecting the institutional perils of aid and instead suggest the confirmation of the 
argument of good governance promotion of development aid. According to Berry and 
Berry (2014)., the innovation and diffusion model explains how governments adopt new 
programs resulting in non-incremental policy changes. The policy framework that 
underlies budget support usually requires states to take new policies or programs or 
suspend ongoing programs such as procurement policy or public financial management 
policies in line with the disbursement triggers (The European Union, 2012). Such 
innovation diffusion may result in efficiency gains at least in the long run even though 
the beneficiary government may partially divert the existing resources to formulate and 
implement these new policies, to the satisfaction of the donor. If the possible gains in the 
medium to long-term compensate the short-run costs resulting from diverting current 
policy inputs, the non-incremental policy change budgetary support impelled would 
reveal efficient government spending. This corresponds to the disciplinary behavior that 
the donor imposes on the aid recipient in Bourguignon and Platteau (2015)’s analytical 
framework. In this sense, the benefit from the non-incremental changes that budget 
support may imply could depend on both the aid amount and the impact of the policy 
change. The policy diffusion theoretical framework is thus useful to examine the extent to 
which the conditionality framework of budget support designed to promote sound 
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policies result in favorable or unfavorable outcomes regarding efficiency gains or losses 
in public service delivery.  
The current assessment of budget support also reveals that it is still difficult for 
governments in recipient countries to foresee donors’ decisions despite the principle of 
improving aid visibility that underlies budget support (Tavakoli & Gregory, 2013). A 
donor may decide to withdraw from using budget support modality. A new donor may 
choose to engage in budget support. The transaction cost approach as it was described by 
Williamson (2014) could elucidate the implications of this dynamics and the 
uncoordinated action that the practice of budget support may generate. This 
organizational theory depicts the way organizational settings result in transaction costs. It 
considers transaction as the unit of analysis to explain how individuals with bounded 
rationality working in the organization can only generate incomplete contracts and seek 
for transaction cost economizing. As Swedlund (2013) said, budget support leads to an 
organizational setting that integrates donors into the policymaking process through voice 
amplification, a seat at the table, and a right to ask questions. The interactions that 
characterize this blended regulatory environment incorporating both donors and 
recipients can result in efficiency losses or gains, mainly due to myopic governance 
structures and incomplete contracts induced by bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behaviors of donors and recipients. Indeed, recipient governments may demonstrate 
unethical conducts and scratch the efficiency of policy inputs that are non-observable to 
donors. However, Bourguignon and Platteau (2015) explain that donors have the 
possibility through disciplinary measures and the integration of executive cost 
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compensation in their aid package to mitigate the recipient’s opportunistic behavior. The 
effectiveness of policy making would thus depend on the degree of alignment between 
the recipient government’s priorities and the policy requirements by donors within the 
blended organizational setting that the practice of budget support generates.  
Summary 
The review of the literature provides how and the extent to which scholars have 
investigated the long-standing issue of aid effectiveness. Various studies have tried to 
understand factors that may explain the mixed results of aid in promoting development. A 
recent yet insufficient literature has focused on the idea that development aid is useful 
when associated with the right policies and institutions. In this sense, some researchers 
have examined the specificities of budget support effectiveness. However, most of these 
studies fall short to investigate one of the essential mechanisms that can reflect the 
promotion of good governance, which is the efficiency of public service delivery or the 
public expenditures efficiency.  
As Molenaers (2012), and Faust, Leidrer, and Schmitt (2012) noted, donors seem 
to emphasize distinctive objectives while designing and implementing budget support. 
This makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of budget support. However, one factor 
that may reconcile these diverging interpretations of budget support policy could be the 
efficiency of public service delivery. Indeed, regardless of its definitions, budget support 
results in transferring financial resources into the recipient’s budget. Therefore, 
understanding the way aid recipient countries use these resources and how donors are 
successful in influencing government spending will inform the effectiveness of budget 
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support policy. The existing literature has not considered explicitly the extent to which 
budget support affects the efficiency of public service delivery.  
This research will contribute to the research on the effectiveness of budget 
support, by assessing the relationship between budget support and public service 
delivery. It will build on Cordello and Dell ’Ariccia’s theoretical framework that 
illustrates the possibility that foreign aid improves governance setting in recipient 
countries. It associates this theory with selected public administration theories to 
investigate the extent to which budget support will favor institutional quality through 
efficient public expenditures. 
Chapter 3 will describe the research methodology.  It will include the rationale for 
the use of time series cross-sectional design and the specification of the methods for the 
analysis of the relationships between budget support and public expenditure efficiency 
for WAEMU countries. There will also be a description of the sample population, 
procedures, ethical considerations, measures, and an explanation of analysis methods. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between aid and 
institutional quality in recipient countries by focusing on budget support and government 
spending efficiency. Governance and institutions in aid recipients’ nations determine aid 
effectiveness (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Good governments consider efficient public 
service delivery that indicates improved allocations of general revenues for increased 
public policy outcomes (Hyman, 2013). According to Bourguignon and Platteau (2015), 
donors could combine need and public governance quality in aid recipient countries in 
their aid allocation objective function with the endogenization of disciplinary measures 
imposed on aid recipients to improve aid outcomes. In practice, this may require 
identifying and using the appropriate aid modality to influence governance settings in 
poor recipient countries.  Donors have increasingly been using budget support to affect 
governance setting in aid recipient countries. The study will explore the extent to which 
budget support is an aid modality improves public service delivery efficiency in 
WAEMU countries which have benefited from increasing aid through budget support 
since 1990. 
This chapter discusses the nature of the study and contains a description of the 
research design and methodology. It includes an overview of the rationale for the 
selection of the research design, population, type of data, and data procedure. Chapter 3 
also includes a description of variables and measurement procedures, an explanation of 
analysis methods, and ethical considerations. 
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Research Design and Approach 
The proposed quasiexperimental design for the study is a Time Series Cross-
Sectional (TSCS) design. This design was used to examine the relationship between 
budget support and public governance quality across WAEMU countries and over 1995-
2015 in two steps. The first step was estimation of the dependent variable which is public 
governance quality for selected WAEMU countries over 1995-2015.  According to 
Agenor and Yilmaz (2013), government spending efficiency (GSE) can serve as a 
measure of public governance quality. By using SFA procedure I estimated GSE 
coefficients for each country over 1995-2015 by means of a panel model in which the 
outcome indicator (HDI) was regressed against total public expenditures. During the 
second step, panel regressions involving fixed-effects and random-effects models were 
used to test the research hypotheses. In these regressions, the estimated GSE coefficients 
were related to budget support variables and covariates including macroeconomic 
stability, corruption index and development level to examine the relationship between 
public governance quality and budget support. 
Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2007) explained that TSCS designs could 
constitute a good alternative to experimental designs, especially when it is difficult to 
define control groups. The cross-sectional dimension of TSCS designs was used to assess 
differences in terms of performances of countries with regards to budget support policy, 
irrespective of time. The chronological dimension allowed to describe the specificities or 
idiosyncrasies of countries in terms of GSE and budget support over time. The two 
dimensions of TSCS allows accounting simultaneously for both within-countries 
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dynamics over time and inter-countries heterogeneity, which is not possible with only 
time series or cross-section data. TSCS also make it possible to consider the influence of 
unobservable individual country’s characteristics on governments’ behaviors.  
It was not possible to use experimental designs, for two main reasons. First, the 
study will cover countries that have already benefited from budget support, and, 
therefore, it is not possible to randomly assign nations between experimental and control 
groups randomly. Second, a donor’s decision to deliver ODA through budget support is 
induced by deliberate policy motives and political agreements between the donor and the 
budget support recipient. Therefore, it is not appropriate to assume that donors 
discriminate between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of budget support randomly or 
that they randomly select years where they use budget support to deliver aid. 
Population and Procedure 
Population  
WAEMU governments that benefit from budget support between 1995 and 2015 
will constitute the population of the study. The WAEMU is a currency area of eight West 
African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, and Togo. There is a joint central bank known as Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), which sets standard monetary policy. There is a 
WAEMU commission that ensures the implementation of the pact of convergence, 
stability, growth, and solidarity which is a political and economic agreement between 
member states. This agreement has implications for governments’ expenditure policies 
within the union as it constitutes a commitment by member states to abide by specific 
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macrofiscal criteria, especially in terms of public finance, inflation, public debt, and 
balance of payment. These requirements mean that governments within the union should 
avoid t primary public deficit and should maintain inflation below 3%, and public debt 
should not surpass 70% of the GDP. Another fiscal criterion was requiring governments 
to maintain public payroll below 35% of tax revenues, which should not be less than 17% 
of GDP. Another rule requires WAEMU governments to spend not less than 20% of 
domestic revenues on public investments.  
According to the World Bank (2016), WAEMU countries are low-income 
countries (LICs) with an average gross national income per capita of less than $1,025 (as 
of the end of 2015).  The OECD (2014) stated that such countries are in the most need of 
foreign aid. WAEMU governments have therefore been benefiting from ODA consisting 
of grants and concessional loans between 1995 and 2015. However, differences in terms 
of the amount of aid they receive are supposed to be correlated with institutional quality. 
The World Bank, for instance, allocates its concessional resources based on its country 
policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) that results in institutional quality rating in 
LICs. The CPIA is a composite index of four clusters which are economic management, 
social inclusion, public sector management and structural policies. Each cluster is 
composed of various sub-components. Each component, as the resulting CPIA average 
score, is rated between 1 indicating the lowest performance and 6 indicating the highest 
performance. According to Carter (2016), the CPIA is meant to reward country’s 
performance regarding the effective use of ODA.  The best-performing WAEMU 
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countries are expected to benefit from more resources compared the lowest-performing 
countries. 
Each WAEMU country was observed 21 times between 1995-2015 regarding 
each variable. The eight countries were thus observed 21 times meaning the maximum 
total number of observations is 168 (8 countries X 21 years). I expect a maximum of five 
predictors per regression to maintain an acceptable degree of freedom and statistical 
power.  
Procedures  
The study will use data from the World Bank world development indicator 
database, the OECD databank, the United Nations human development database, and the 
WAEMU central bank. The World Bank world development indicator database provides 
long series of comparable data between countries regarding total public expenditures and 
allocations to various economic and social sectors. The Human Development database is 
the repository for the HDI and associated indicators, especially selected health and 
education outcomes including life expectancy, maternal mortality rates, and primary 
school attendance. The OECD computes statistical data regarding ODA, including total 
ODA flows per recipient and donors, ODA modality used by donors, ODA per sector. 
The WAEMU Central Bank databank includes information on governmental financial 
operations including the structure of revenues and expenditures. It also includes data 
regarding budget support and total aid amounts WAEMU countries have benefited from.  
All these databases are free to access online. The World Bank and United Nations 
databases do not require subscriptions to download their data, which is available in 
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various formats, including Excel. The OECD database requires a private subscription to 
download data. These three databases incorporate appropriate metadata that provides 
necessary information to assess the quality and reliability of available data. Also, the 
OECD and World Bank have put in place online libraries where one can access various 
qualitative information on ODA, budget support and other variables freely. 
Measurement 
The Dependent Variable: GSE  
Government spending efficiency (GSE) is the dependent variable and is at ratio 
level. Its measurement will consist of the estimation of efficiency coefficients for the 
eight countries for each year. The GSE coefficient indicates the extent to which 
governments maximize the available resources to achieve its policy targets. Its estimation 
requires relating policy inputs to policy outcome and derives the efficiency ratio. 
The policy outcome: HDI. Giving that WAEMU countries are mainly LICs, the 
targeted objective of WAEMU governments is to promote development. This policy 
outcome reflects the engagement of the international community including WAEMU 
countries to the Monterrey declaration on MDGs in 2000. The MDGs consisted of eight 
development outcomes that WAEMU governments committed to achieve between 1990 
and 2015 regarding extreme poverty, education, gender, child and maternal health, and 
environment. An appropriate policy outcome would thus be a synthetic index that 
summarizes these key dimensions that represent the primary objectives of public policy 
over the indicated period in the WAEMU states. However, the lack of continued MDG 
data for all countries limits the possibility of constructing this index.  
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Another well-established measure of the level of development is HDI UNDP 
publishes each year for most countries in the world. HDI is in line with Sen’s indication 
that development should go beyond improving the wealth of the economy in which 
individuals live to integrate human wealth (UNDP, 1990). The calculation of HDI 
integrates three dimensions: standard of living, education, and health. A sub-index is 
calculated for each dimension based on defined variables. The gross national income is 
used to calculate the sub-index for the standard of living dimension. The expected and 
mean years of schooling are used to calculate the sub-index for the education dimension. 
Life expectancy at birth measures the health dimension and is used to calculate the sub-
index for health. HDI is the geometric mean of the three sub-indexes calculated for the 
three dimensions.  To ensure comparisons between countries and classification, HDI 
integrates an aspect that relates to each of the three dimensions (standard of living, 
education, and health), the level a country achieves to the highest level in a given year. 
As conceptualized and firstly released in 1990 by the UNDP, the mathematical equation 
for the calculation of a sub-index is the following: For a dimension D which maybe 
standard of living or education or health, the Sub-Index (SI) is calculated for the country 




                                      (1) 
Dit is the value taken by the variable measuring the dimension D for the country 
(i) at a year (t). For instance, Dit could be the value of GNI for Benin in 2005 or the value 
of life expectancy at birth for Senegal in 1998. Dt and dt are respectively the highest and 
lowest values of the variable measuring the dimension D at the year (t). 
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This calculation can under or overestimate the self-dynamics in delivering policy 
outcomes in countries. The resulting government efficiency can thus hide the actual 
efficiency dynamics in countries. Following improvement on the measurement of human 
development, a modification of the index was performed by removing the yearly relative 
dimension. In the following equation, the self-dynamics at country level is captured by 





                                      (2) 
The resulting policy outcome index provides scores for each country and each 
year. By relating this policy outcome composite index to government expenditure, it is 
possible to estimate efficiency coefficients.  
The policy input variables. Government total expenditure (GTE) is the primary 
explanatory variable to estimate the efficiency coefficient. It comprises all spending a 
government disburses during a year except the debt service amount. The latter does not 
benefit directly to a development sector such as health or education but consists of 
payments of amortizations of loans the government contracts.  Since the government 
would have used the debt amount for public service delivery, including their 
reimbursement in the total expenditure will count double for delivering public service and 
will introduce bias in the resulting government spending efficiency. For the estimation of 
the efficiency coefficient, the measurement of the total expenditure will be in the 
proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP). 
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The estimation of the efficiency coefficient will also include the following 
covariates: population size, population density, level of development and the overall 
education level in the country (Ivohasina & Razafimahefa, 2015). The population size is 
the number of inhabitants in each of the WAEMU countries each year. Population density 
is the number of inhabitants per square km in each state at a given time. A low population 
density regionally can affect the level of efficiency in delivering public services. For 
instance, the distance separating villages may require the government to establish more 
health care centers or classrooms to guarantee access to all individuals. The real gross 
domestic product per capita is a proxy of the level of development to account for 
technological progress that can introduce heterogeneity in countries and their efficiency 
performance. The level of education is the average schooling years in each state. A more 
educated population can hold the government accountable to their spending and thus 
oblige efficiency. Also, a more educated population is a proxy for the quality of human 
capital that public bureaucracy uses to produce development outcomes. The World Bank 
world development indicator database includes series of these indicators. Also, the 
United Nations Development Programme, on its human development index website, 
provides information on the average years of schooling and other social indicators for 
most countries in the world.  
Procedure for measuring efficiency coefficients. The measurement of 
efficiency can be dated back to Farrell (1957). Farrell introduced the notion of technical 
and allocative efficiencies to distinguish two sub-optimal decisions a producer can make. 
Technical inefficiency corresponds to a situation whereby the producer uses an excessive 
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amount of input to reach a given level of production. In other words, the same quantity of 
output could have been obtained by spending much less in factors of production. 
Allocative inefficiency corresponds to a sub-optimal combination of factors given their 
price and marginal productivities. 
This study focuses on technical efficiency. The government uses its available 
resources to produce public goods or deliver public services such as in the health and 
education sectors. By assimilating this governmental function to a private producer, the 
way in which the government spends its revenues to generate human development (HDI) 
is analyzed regarding efficiency.  
There are two main methodologies in the literature one can use to calculate 
efficiency: non-parametric and parametric methods (Ivohasina & Razafimahefa, 2015). 
The data envelopment analysis (DEA) is the non-parametric method researchers use 
intensively in the literature to determine the optimum point at which the maximum output 
is obtained, given the inputs available. It is appropriate in a context of data limitation, 
constraining to the use of cross-sectional dataset. With the view to make the best use of 
the longitudinal data available for the WAEMU countries, this study will rather rely on 
the parametric-based Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which  consists of estimating a 
production function by assuming that there is an ideal HDI no government can exceed. 
Governments who deliver at or close to this ideal level are efficient whereas the deviation 
in a country’s HDI from the ideal HDI is the measure of the efficiency of this 
government. The model used in the present study is based on the assumption that the 
state, which is assimilated to a producer, may be mistaken in the allocation of resources 
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available for the production of public goods and services to improve human development. 
This model was inspired by the existing works of efficient stochastic frontier estimations, 
notably those of Aigner, Lovell, Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977), 
Kumbhakar (1987) and Greene (2005). The government production function can be 
written as follows: 
𝑄 =  𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)𝑒𝑢     u≤0                          (3) 
With Q, the production, f, the technology function, x, the vector of inputs, β the 
parameters of the production function to be estimated, and u, the coefficient of technical 
inefficiency. The negative values of u correspond to production levels below the 
maximum possible. 
In log-linear, Government’s production, which is the delivery of HDI, is as 
follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄 = ln 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽) + 𝑢 + 𝑣     (4)  
Where: Q is production, x are the input factors, 𝛽 the parameters, v is random 
error/statistical noise and u is inefficiency.  
The behavior of the State is assimilated to that of a rational producer who 
minimizes its costs according to the following program: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑤𝑥𝑒𝑢 𝑠𝑐 𝑄 =  𝑓(𝑥, 𝛽)𝑒𝑢    (5) 
w: the price of the inputs vector 
The output of the state in each sector is estimated using panel data methodology, 
following the nonlinear and iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) procedure. 
The eight WAEMU countries will constitute the individual dimension of the panel. The 
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technical inefficiency coefficients or the distance separating the State HDI from the 
optimal HDI are obtained from the fixed or random effects resulting from the estimation 
on panel data. The production function to be estimated is therefore written as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖 = ln 𝑓(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖                     (6) 
i represents the individual country. 
Following Ivohasina and Razafimahefa (2015), and given the use of long panel 
data, the efficiency will be time-varying in such a way that: 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑡). 𝑢𝑖  and 𝑔(𝑡) =
 𝑒−𝜆(𝑡−𝑇𝑖). It is possible with this approach to consider variables other than government 
expenditures. Structural factors in addition to public expenditure, such as socio-economic 
characteristics of the country, can also affect the efficiency of public service delivery in 
each State.  
The measurement of efficiency coefficients will rely on two different estimations 
to check the robustness of the estimates. The first two estimates will follow two 
measurement methods Battese and Coelli (1988) and Jondrow, Lovell, Materov, and 
Schmidt, (1982) suggested. A third estimate may consist of considering heterogeneity 
and heteroscedasticity in the estimates. A high correlation between these estimates will 
provide me with a significant level of confidence in robust efficiency coefficient 
estimates. 
The Independent Variable: Budget Support 
Budget support policy is the key independent variable for the study. Various 
measures serve to specify the budget support policy regarding the hypotheses to be tested. 
The first indicator is the total amount of budget support (GTB). It represents the amount 
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of foreign aid a country receives through the budget support modality. Based on the 
WAEMU central bank data, this amount exists in CFA, the common currency of the 
union. The second measure is the proportion of budget support (GPB). It is the ratio 
between the amount a country receives through budget support and the total aid that goes 
into the state. This variable is to reflect the contribution of budget support to the aid-led 
relationship between the WAEMU counties as aid receivers and the aid providers. The 
third measure is the proportion of total government spending that budget support 
represents (GBS). It consists of dividing the amount of budget support in CFA by the 
total government revenue in CFA. A contribution of budget support to improve 
Government spending efficacy should reflect a positive correlation between GPB and 
efficiency coefficient on the one side, and between GBS and efficiency, on the other side. 
Also, a category level variable (BSP) will distinguish a year a country benefits 
from budget support from a year it does not. This dichotomy indicator consists of a 
transformation of the panel dataset of countries and years into a cross-sectional database 
where only the benefice or not of budget support matters, irrespective of the state that 
benefits from this assistance and the year it benefits. Indeed, the TSCS involves multiple 
data sets. One is panel data set (country x time) and another is cross-sectional data set. 
The panel data set considers for each year, the situation of each country regarding 
benefiting or not budget support over 1995-2015. The cross-section data set does not 
differentiate country and year one by one. It rather considers binomial data points (1 or 0) 




Based on existing studies such as Adam, Delis, and Kammas (2014) and 
Ivohasina and Razafimahefa (2015), control variables that may influence public service 
efficiency are level of democracy, level of corruption and macroeconomic stability. A 
measure of level of democracy is the high-level index which the Varieties of Democracy 
Institute has recently computed (Mechkova and Sigman, 2016). This indicator captures 
the multidimensional nature of democracy by considering seven high-level principles of 
democracy including electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, 
majoritarian and consensual. While it seems difficult to establish a robust relationship 
between democratic governance and development, one may expect enhanced social 
accountability requirement in a democratic setting. Therefore, governments in advanced 
democratic settings could be more accountable to efficient public service delivery. 
However, since other democratic values such as equity or equality may force states to a 
trade-off, it is not clear how the level of democracy can affect the relationship between 
budget support and efficient public service delivery. 
There is a measure of corruption that International Transparency-an international 
non-governmental organization-computes yearly since 1995. Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) is a composite index from the opinions by various stakeholders such as 
businesspeoples and country experts (Transparency International, 2016). The index 
ranges from zero, meaning the worst situation, to 100, the less corrupted state. A high 
level of corruption would indicate a high propensity of government officers to embezzle 
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public resources. This embezzlement would result in inefficient public service delivery as 
the actual unit cost would be high for a given outcome level. 
A proxy of macroeconomic stability is the variability in the consumer price index 
(Skorobogatova, 2016). An unstable macroeconomic framework can negatively affect 
government’s decisions regarding technical efficiency. This imprecision in decision 
making could result in an overutilization of inputs (resources) through inappropriate 
discretionary choices or artificial increases in unit costs which could generate efficiency 
losses. It is also well established in the literature that macroeconomic instability can be 
detrimental to economic growth (Skorobogatova, 2016). Since this later is a component 
of human development, one could expect that the level of stability influences the 
relationship between budget support and efficient public service delivery measured by the 
human development index efficiency coefficient. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis will be in line with the time series cross-sectional design using panel 
regressions. The secondary data collected from various sources will be organized in a 
single Excel file. For each variable, a table recording country (line) and year (column) 
will be developed. This data treatment will allow deriving descriptive statistics to show 
mean and standard deviation. Trends in the evolution of key variables (budget support 
and human development index) will help analyze stylized facts that may be considered in 
conducting regressions and discussions. 
STATA 15 will serve for various panel regressions including the estimation of 
efficiency coefficients. The first research question is Research Question #1. To what 
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extent does the use of budget support in WAEMU countries measured by a dummy 
variable of 1 (the country benefits budget support) or 0 (the country does not benefit) 
predict the quality of their public governance, measured by their public expenditure 
efficiency over time? This question is to investigate the extent to which efficiency 
coefficients vary about the benefice of budget support or not. The related null hypothesis 
is the following: H01: There is no relationship between the use of budget support in 
WAEMU countries over time and the quality of public governance, measured by the 
efficiency of public expenditures. The alternative hypothesis is Ha1: There is a positive 
relationship between the use of budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the 
quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures.  I expect 
a positive correlation between the number of times a country benefits from budget 
support and the quality of its public service delivery measured by the efficiency of public 
expenditures in WAEMU countries. This hypothesis will be tested by relating the 
category variable of budget support (BSP) that describes the benefice or not of budget 
support to the efficiency coefficients. A country benefits budget support (dummy is 1) 
when the county’s budget indicates received ODA through budget support aid modality 
in the considered year. When there is no ODA indicated in the country’s budget for the 
given year, the country is considered to not be engaged in budget support with aid 
providers (dummy is 0). The significance (or not) of the dummy will indicate whether 
there is a significant difference between the mean efficiency coefficient both in times and 
between countries. When this factor is significant, its sign will show the nature of the 
relationship between budget support and the use of budget support aid modality. 
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The second research question is: To what extent does the amount of development 
aid WAEMU countries receive over time through budget support predicts the quality of 
public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The second null 
hypothesis is H02: There is no relationship between the absolute amount of budget 
support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery, 
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. The second alternative 
hypothesis is Ha2: There is a relationship between the absolute amount of budget support 
WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public service delivery, measured 
by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. I expect there is no significant 
relationship between the absolute amount of budget support a government received and 
its spending efficiency for WAEMU countries. The hypothesis is tested by regressing 
GSE coefficients for the eight WAEMU countries against budget support amount for the 
eight countries over 1995-2015. 
The third research question is: To what extent does the proportion of budget 
support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries predicts the quality of public 
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The third null hypothesis 
is H03: there is no relationship over time between the proportion of budget support 
amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public service delivery, 
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The third alternative hypothesis is 
Ha3: There is a relationship over time between the proportion of budget support amount 
in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public service delivery, 
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. I expect there is a positive relationship 
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between the proportion of budget support in total aid and public budget efficiency for 
WAEMU countries. This hypothesis is tested by regressing GSE coefficients for the eight 
WAEMU countries against the ratio budget support to total aid received. 
The fourth research question is: To what extent does the share of budget support 
amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries predicts the quality of public 
governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures? The fourth null 
hypothesis is H04: There is no relationship over time between the share of budget support 
amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public 
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures.  The fourth 
alternative hypothesis is Ha4: There is a relationship over time between the share of 
budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality 
of their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. I 
expect there is a positive relationship between the share of budget support amount in total 
government revenue and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. This 
hypothesis is tested by regressing GSE coefficients for the eight WAEMU countries 
against the ratio of budget support to total government revenues. 
The fifth research question is: To what extent does the initial level of institutional 
quality affect the prediction of the quality of public governance by the amount of budget 
support in WAEMU countries over time? The associated null is H05: The initial level of 
governance does not affect the relationship between the amount of budget support and the 
efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries over time. The alternative 
hypothesis is Ha5: The initial level of governance affects the relationship between the 
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amount of budget support and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries 
over time. I expect that the initial level of governance moderates the relationship between 
budget support variables and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries. 
To test this hypothesis, the same four panel regressors of the first four research questions 
will be re-estimated with the introduction of the GSE coefficient lag to test the influence 
of the initial level of governance. Also, for validity check, the lagged GSE coefficient 
will be replaced by the Government Effectiveness Index computed by the World Bank. 
The sixth research question is: To what extent does the political context affect the 
prediction of the quality of public governance, measured by the efficiency of public 
expenditures, by budget support in WAEMU countries over time? The related null 
hypothesis is H06: The political context measured by the level of democratization does 
not affect the relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in 
WAEMU countries. The alternative hypothesis is Ha6: The political context measured by 
the level of democratization affect the relationship between budget support and public 
expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. I expect that the political context measured 
by the level of democratization significantly influences the relationship between budget 
support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU countries. To test this hypothesis, 
panel regressor is estimated by introducing democracy index in previous panel 
regressions of the first four research questions. An interaction variable of democracy 
index budget support variables was also introduced in panel regressions in addition to the 
democracy index. For validity check, democracy index will be replaced by political 
stability index using the same panel regressions. 
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Threats to Validity 
As O’Sullivan, Rassel and Berner (2008) advised, I will conduct an assessment of 
secondary data regarding coding, measurement, and reliability. The consultation of the 
available metadata to the data collected online will inform selection and adequate data 
treatments. By using triangulation, the data source that minimizes bias in data will be 
chosen. Despite the traditional definition of development aid, organizations tend to tailor 
definitions and conceptualizations based on their aid practices. This adaptation may affect 
the comparability of data computed and made available by aid providers. The comparison 
of data donors made available with the aid data available at country levels will be 
undertaken to analyze potential bias regarding data aid data comparability. The WAEMU 
Central Bank calculates and treats national public budget data which also include aid and 
budget support data. As the unique central bank for the 8 countries, BCEAO produced 
comparable public budget data using a unique methodology to adjust country data. 
To test the validity of results, I will use various panel regressors. As already 
underlined for the GSE coefficient estimates, two different measures will be used. For the 
analysis of the relationship between budget support and public service efficiency, the 
fixed effect model is appropriate. This model assumes homogeneity of the coefficients. 
Constants as the only sources of heterogeneity are deterministic (i.e., non-random) and 
differ according to countries and years. However, to test the validity of findings, the 
random-effects model will be considered as the alternative panel model. Fixed effects 
models may be biased due to failure to control individual effects. Studying individual 
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effects, where they exist, improves the accuracy of the estimates and ensures a correct 
evaluation of the variance of the estimated coefficients.  
To ensure the validity of panel data regressors, I will examine the homogeneous or 
heterogeneous specification of the data generating process. Econometrically, this is 
equivalent to testing differences in country coefficients of the explanatory variables. 
Economically, the model specification tests allow assume that the theoretical model 
studied is perfectly identical for all countries, or that there are idiosyncrasies to each 
country. These procedures will test whether a fixed-effect versus a random-effects model 
has a better fit to the data. 
The first test to be conducted is Fisher’s test or Likelihood Ratio Test which is to 
test the hypotheses H0: Absence of fixed effects versus Ha: Presence of fixed effects 
following the estimation of the fixed effects model. The test results in the Fischer statistic 
and supports the hypothesis H0 of the presence of fixed effects when the statistic is 
greater than the critical value read on the Fisher table. 
The second test is that of Breusch and Pagan (1979) used to test the hypotheses H0: 
Absence of random effects versus Ha: Presence of random effects after estimating the 
random effect model. The Breusch and Pagan statistic is computed. The test supports the 
presence of random effects if the probability of the Breusch-Pagan statistic is below the 
critical threshold (5% or .05). 
The analysis of the model specification is concluded by the Hausman (1978)’s test. 
It consists of discriminating between fixed effects and random effects and thus decide on 
the appropriate model to use for the analysis. This test is based on the following 
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hypotheses: Ho: Presence of random effects (model with random effects) versus Ha. The 
test supports the presence of fixed effects (model with fixed effects) if the probability of 
the statistic (Prob> chi2) is below the critical threshold (5%). In this case, the fixed 
effects model is appropriate to conduct the analysis. 
Ethical Considerations 
There are limited ethical issues and risks for this study, because of the following 
reasons. The study does not cover or interact with living persons. The population of the 
research will consist of states and aggregated data at country level. Since secondary data 
are publicly available there is minimal risk of collecting and divulging personal or 
country data without consent. Likewise, there will be no physical engagement with 
government officials that may cause unwanted intrusion, disturbance, abuse, 
unpleasantness, or generate risks on their careers. Furthermore, since data are freely 
accessible online, the issue of confidentiality in terms of whether a state wants to 
disseminate data or not is also mitigated, because the concerned data are already made 
available with states’ consent. Finally, although I am working for a development agency, 
this agency is not engaged in budget support. Therefore, ethical issues and risks related to 
researchers working in their organization are minimal. My professional setting has no 
direct implication on analyses and discussions although I am working on development 
assistance. 
Summary 
The study will use time series cross-sectional design to assess the relationship 
between public service delivery efficiency and budget support in the WAEMU countries. 
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Panel data will be constituted with eight WAEMU countries over 1995-2015. The 
dependent variable will be measured by GSE coefficients that will result from an SFA 
with a regression of HDI over total public expenditures and other covariates such as 
population size, population density, and level of development. The estimated GSE 
coefficients will be further related to different budget support variables and covariates to 
test null and alternative hypotheses that underlie the six research questions. The selected 
software to run panel regressions is STATA. There will also be robustness tests with the 
use of alternative variables and models. The study will use secondary data that are openly 
accessible through various databases, without prior permission. There are therefore no 















Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of the current study was to quantitatively examine whether there is a 
relationship between budget support as an aid modality and public spending efficiency in 
WAEMU countries.  The assessment consists of testing six directional and exploratory 
research questions using a TSCS for the eight WAEMU countries which have benefited 
from budget support between 1995 and 2015. This chapter provides a description of the 
variables in this study and summarizes the results of analyses. 
Selected Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
The two tables below define and describe the variables used for the analyses in 
this study. Table 1 includes a list of variables, their definitions, and sources of data 
related to each of the variables. Selected descriptive statistics including mean, P50, 
minimum, maximum and variance appear in Table 2.  
Table 1 
 
Labelling Variables and Sources of Data 
Label Variables Sources 
HDI Human Development Index UNDP-HDI website 
GOV_REV Total Government Revenues WAEMU Central Bank 
GOV_DEP Total public expenditures WAEMU Central Bank 
GOV_INT Debt service WAEMU Central Bank 
GOV_NET Total expenditures except debt services WAEMU Central Bank 
ODA_TOT Total ODA WAEMU Central Bank 
BSP Total Budget Support WAEMU Central Bank 
BSP DUM Dummy Budget support Calculation by the Author 
GDP Gross Domestic Product WAEMU Central Bank 







GOV_net_gdp Ratio of expenditure except debt service to 
GDP 
Calculation by the Author 
BSP_gdp Ratio of budget support to GDP Calculation by the Author 
BSP_rev Ratio of Budget support to Revenue Calculation by the Author 
BSP_oda Ratio of Budget support to ODA Calculation by the Author 
POL1 Democracy index Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
MACRO_S Macroeconomic stability (CPI) WAEMU Central Bank 
POP_S Population size UN Population Division 
POP_D Population density UN Population Division 
EDUC2 Expected years of schooling UNDP-HDI website 
EDUC Mean school years UNDP-HDI website 
CORR Corruption Perception index Transparency International 
POL2 Political stability index Global Economy.com 




Statistical Summary of the Data of the Eight WAEMU Countries 
Variable Mean P50 Sd Variance Min Max 
       
hdi .3817537 .3945 .0657405 .0043218 .226 .494 
gov_rev 690.1086 462.15 667.9214 446119.1 9.638 3904.847 
gov_dep 771.1043 519.75 750.2147 562822.1 30.3 4457.505 
gov_int 54.86322 20.92712 78.26362 6125.194 .1 348.3 
gov_net 716.2411 502.8139 698.5328 487948 22 4160 
oda_tot 102.9134 72.56775 130.021 16905.46 3.5 1244.5 
bsp 39.68528 14.6 110.5828 12228.56 0 1169 
bspdum .6875 1 .4648348 .2160714 0 1 
gdp 3517.543 2452.745 3342.179 1.12e+07 118.329 19362.59 
govgdp .1961515 .1911492 .0430931 .001857 .0992596 .3529226 
bspgdp .0163505 .0067718 .041784 .0017459 0 .4210636 
gov_net_gdp .1961515 .1911492 .0430931 .001857 .0992596 .3529226 
bspgov_rev .0743217 .0359076 .1081504 .0116965 0 .7007331 
bspoda_tot .2647833 .2470309 .2366361 .0559966 0 1 
pol .3185972 .3324382 .0859002 .0073788 .1270253 .4736821 
macro_s 94.75335 92.651 21.0855 444.5985 21.084 147.554 
pop_s 10618.93 10619.84 5460.881 2.98e+07 1113.541 23108.47 
                                                                                                                                                      (table continues) 
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pop_d 49.30335 49.14808 29.68105 880.965 7.223175 130.612  
educ 2.460131 2.4 1.072892 1.151097 .8 4.8 
educ2 6.790341 6.8 2.422294 5.867506 .4 12 
corr 28.9619 29 5.822575 33.90238 17 44 
 
Estimation of GSE Coefficients 
 The efficiency coefficients of public expenditure were estimated using SFA. The 
parameters of the stochastic frontier model and those of technical inefficiency are 
simultaneously estimated using the maximum likelihood method. These are the 
parameters of the variance of the likelihood function in terms of 𝜎2 = 𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝜈
2 and γ= 
𝜎𝜇
2/ 𝜎2. These parameters are analyzed according to their sign and magnitude. The 
parameter γ is the most important in terms of the specification and validation of the 
stochastic frontier model. It measures the share of the contribution to the error due to 
technical inefficiency in the total variability of the output and thus orients the decision on 
the existence of the technical inefficiency. 
 Battese and Coelli (1988) used a time-invariant model in which any unobserved 
heterogeneity is constant over time and is considered as inefficiency. Battese and Coelli’s 
concern was how to separate the two components which are static error and error 
representing technical inefficiency. The static error follows its standard distribution. The 
technical inefficiency error is assumed independent and distributed according to a 
normal-truncated conditional distribution to zero with mean 𝜇𝑖 and 
variance 𝜎𝜇
2(N(𝜇𝑖 , 𝜎𝜇
2)). According to Jondrow et al. (1982), the static error can follow 
either an exponential or semi-normal distribution. 
78 
 
 The implementation of Bettese and Coelli and Jondrow et al’s models  consisted 
of regressing HDI variable labeled hdi over GTE except debt services labeled gov_net 
and controlling for covariates including gross domestic product (gdp), population size 
(pop_s), population density (pop_d) and macroeconomic stability (macro_s). The 
variables gdp, pop-s, and pop_d were not significant and were subsequently removed 
from the model. Table 3 and Table 4 include results of estimates of parameters of the 
stochastic frontier model and those of technical inefficiency for the two models.  
Table 3 
Parameters of Stochastic Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Using Jondrow et al’s 
Model 
Variable/parameter B z P>IzI 
Frontier 
     Gov-net 










sigma_u 𝜎𝜇  .0270666 10.00 0.000 
sigma_v 𝜎𝜈  .0072273 3.83 0.000 
Note.  Log likelihood = 469.8317; Prob > chi2= 0.000; Wald chi2 = 713.30 
sigma_u 𝜎𝜇 is the parameter for inefficiency and sigma_v 𝜎𝜈  is the parameter for error. 
From Table 3, gamma (γ) = 𝜎𝜇
2/ 𝜎2 = 93.34460298% is the contribution of inefficiency to 






Parameters of Stochastic Frontier and Technical Inefficiency Using Bettese and Coelli’s 
Model 
Variable/parameter B z P>IzI 
Frontier 
     Gov-net 










sigma_u 𝜎𝜇  .6510519 0.75 0.454 
sigma_v 𝜎𝜈  .006315 4.89 0.000 
Note. gamma (γ) = 𝜎𝜇
2/ 𝜎2 = 99.99059249% is contribution of inefficiency to total output 
variability. 
Estimates show that a significant share of total output variability (HDI) is due to 
technical inefficiency in the eight WAEMU countries over the period 1995-2015. The 
contribution of inefficiency to total output variability labeled gamma (γ) is 93% for 
Jondrow et al’s smodel and and 99% for Battese and Coelli’s model. However, the 
technical inefficiency parameter is not statistically significant in the Bettese and Coelli’s 
model. Since the two models generate statistically comparable results, the estimates from 




Figure 1. Graphic relationship between estimates from the two models per country. 
The gamma (γ) value estimates an average efficiency of 12.5% and 87.5% of 
technical inefficiency based on Jondrow et al.’s model. In comparison, the average 
estimate efficiency was 12.3% against 87.7 inefficiencies with Battese and Coelli’s 
model. The efficiency coefficient varies between 2.2% and 33.3% for Jondrow et al. and 
between 2.1% and 35.4% for the Battese and Coelli model. The composite nature of the 
dependent variable can partly explain the high levels of technical inefficiency. As a 
result, this variable tends to aggregate the inefficiencies associated with each of its three 
main components: gross domestic product, education, and health.  
Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Efficiency Coefficients for Each Country Using the Two Models  
Country Variable mean p50 variance sd min max 
Bénin 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1080005 .1026727 .0298953 .0008937 .0594554 .1655579 
eff_bc88_tn .1048035 .0992227 .0306892 .0009418 .056013 .1659587 
Burkina-Faso 
       
eff_jn82_hn .119567 .1106343 .0342602 .0011738 .0708788 .1790362 
eff_bc88_tn .1182697 .1084087 .0365507 .001336 .0676454 .1828544 
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Cote d'Ivoire 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1958093 .1812254 .0603498 .0036421 .1100449 .3344572 
eff_bc88_tn .2004652 .1836504 .0653243 .0042673 .1104342 .3541899 
Guinea Bissau 
       
eff_jn82_hn .0834685 .0849391 .0243475 .0005928 .0220481 .1113187 
eff_bc88_tn .0775948 .0788027 .0226835 .0005145 .0206643 .1039918 
Mali 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1464735 .136689 .0352777 .0012445 .0920885 .21416 
eff_bc88_tn .1431185 .1331385 .0368051 .0013546 .0875079 .2149935 
Niger 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1094819 .0994483 .0314354 .0009882 .067772 .1707291 
eff_bc88_tn .1063783 .09524 .0334808 .001121 .0640445 .1732352 
Sénégal 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1393228 .1302793 .0398682 .0015895 .0835202 .2026351 
eff_bc88_tn .1409723 .1311604 .0438289 .001921 .0807232 .2112545 
Togo 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1003507 .0924467 .0234055 .0005478 .0632222 .1408346 
eff_bc88_tn .095378 .0871374 .0233787 .0005466 .0594156 .1363958 
Average  eff_jn82_hn .1253093 .1137091 .0485614 .0023582 .0220481 .3344572 
eff_bc88_tn .1233725 .110612 .0521568 .0027203 .0206643 .3541899 
 
RQ1: Relationship between GSE and Budget Support  
 The first research question was about whether there is a positive relationship 
between the use of budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the quality of 
public governance, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The regression of 
the GSE coefficients of the eight countries over the dummy variable of benefiting or not 
budget support during the study period is significant for both the fixed-effect model F(3, 
94) = 251.77, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 775.315, p< 0.000. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the estimates. The likelihood ratio test (Fisher test) 
revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 57.77, p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange multiplier test purported the existence of random effects, chibar2(01) = 444.21, 
p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed the presence of random effects, 
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chi2(3) = 0.50, p = .9193. The random-effects model is thus appropriate to test the 
relationship between the benefice or not of budget support by WAEMU countries and 
their public expenditure efficiency. 
Table 6 
Fixed-effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget 
Support with Covariates 
Variable Β SE t p 
Budget support dummy .0171 .0051 3.34 .001 
Macroeconomic stability .0023 .000 19.81 .000 
Corruption .0012 .000 3.87 .000 
Note. F (3,94) = 251.77, p < .0000, R² = .6756  
Table 7 
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget 
Support with Covariates 
Variable Β SE z p 
Budget support dummy .0165 .00497 3.32 .001 
Macroeconomic stability .0023 .0001 20.38 .000 
Corruption .0012 .0003 4.04 .000 
Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 775.15, p < .0000, R² = .6756 
The random effects model provides the best estimates as it informs on the 
independence of the specific effects with the explanatory variables. It also indicates that 
technical efficiency incorporates significant idiosyncrasies across countries. This model 
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is the most suitable for explaining technical efficiency by the budget support dummy 
variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of corruption.  
In the random-effects regression, budget support dummy, β = .0165, z = 3.32, p < 
.0001 was significant. The Beta coefficient (.0165) indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between the efficiency of government spending and the benefit dummy of 
budget support. Countries that benefited budget support in a year also experienced a 
positive change in public expenditure efficiency. Macroeconomic stability β = - .0023, z 
= 20.38, p < .0000 and the level of corruption, β = - .0012, z = 4.04, p < .0000 were also 
significant. They positively predict public expenditure efficiency. Countries with a high 
level of inflation (high instability) or corruption tend to react positively to the 
improvement of government efficiency with the benefice of budget support. These 
findings supported the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the use of 
budget support in WAEMU countries over time and the quality of public governance, 
measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. 
RQ2: Relationship between GSE and Budget Support Amount  
 RQ2 was about whether there is a significant relationship between the absolute 
amount of budget support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public 
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time. The test of 
the expected directional hypothesis consisted of regressing the GSE coefficients over the 
ratio of budget support amount the recipient country benefited.  
 Tables 8 and 9 show results of fixed-effect and random-effect regression tests. 
Budget support amount was not significant in either of the fixed effect (β = 0.000, p < 
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.000) and random effect (β = .00305, z = 1.27, p = .206) models. The likelihood ratio test 
(Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 51.11, p< .0000. The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random effects, 
chibar2(01) =   445.28, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed the 
presence of random effects, chi2(3) = 0.54, p = .91. The random-effects model provided 
the best estimates and was the most suitable for explaining technical efficiency by the 
budget support amount as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of 
corruption. The budget support amount did not predict government spending efficiency. 
These results supported the hypothesis that there is no relationship between the absolute 
amount of budget support WAEMU governments receive and the quality of their public 
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures over time.  
Table 8 
Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget 
Support Amount with Covariates 
Variable β SE t p 
Budget support amount 0.000 0.000 1.00 .000 
Macroeconomic stability 31.000 24.000 291.0 200.00 





Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Budget 
Support with Covariates 
Variable β SE z p 
Budget support amount .0305 .0241 1.27 .206 
Macroeconomic stability .0024 .0001 22.19 .000 
Corruption .0013 .00003 4.03 .000 
 
RQ3: Relationship between GSE and Proportion of Budget Support Amount in 
Total Aid 
If the absolute amount of budget support did not predict public expenditure 
efficiency, its weight in total aid a country receives could be a possible determinant. RQ3 
was about whether there was a positive relationship over time between the proportion of 
budget support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of their public 
service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. The test of the 
expected directional hypothesis associated to RQ3 consisted of regressing the efficiency 
coefficients over the proportion of the budget support amount in total ODA of the 
recipient country. Tables 10 and 11 show the results of the regressions. 
The regression results are significant for both the fixed-effect model F (3, 94) = 
250.52, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 766.41, p< 0.000. The 
likelihood ratio test (Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 55.80, 
p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random 
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effects, chibar2(01) =   374.27, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed 
the presence of fixed effects, chi2(3) = .88, p = .8298. 
The fixed-effects model provided the best estimates and was the most suitable for 
explaining technical efficiency by the proportion of budget support amount in total aid 
variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of corruption. 
Budget support as share of total aid, β = .0228, t = 3.27, p = .002 was significant. The 
Beta coefficient (.0228) indicates that there is a positive relationship between the 
efficiency of government spending and the proportion of budget support in total aid. The 
higher the volume of budget support a government receives in the proportion of total aid, 
the higher its spending efficiency. The effect is higher than in the case of budget support 
dummy (benefiting or not budget support irrelevance to the amount). The covariates 
factors macroeconomic stability β = - .0023, t = 20.42, p < .0000 and the level of 
corruption, β = - .0014, t = 4.37, p < .0000 were also significant. These results suggest 
that budget support, contingent to its share in total aid, can generate efficiency gains. The 
results supported the hypothesis that there is a relationship over time between the 
proportion of budget support amount in total aid in WAEMU countries and the quality of 
their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public expenditures. 
Table 10 
Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of 
Budget Support in Total Aid with Covariates 
Variable β SE t p 
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Share of Budget support in 
total aid 
.0228 .00698 3.27 .002 
Macroeconomic stability .0023 .0001 20.42 .000 
Corruption  .0014 .00003 4.37 .000 
Note. F (3,94) = 250.52, p < .0000, R² = .6737 
Table 11 
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of 
Budget Support in Total Aid with Covariates 
Variable β SE z p 
Share of Budget support in 
total government revenue 
.02211 .00687 3.22 .001 
Macroeconomic stability .00233 .0001 20.82 .000 
Corruption .00145 .00003 4.56 .000 
Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 766.41, p < .0000, R² = .6753 
RQ4: Relationship between GSE and the Share of Budget Support Amount in Total 
Government Revenue 
RQ4 was about whether there was positive relationship over time between the 
share of budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and 
the quality of their public service delivery, measured by the efficiency of public 
expenditures. The test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ4 consisted of 
regressing the efficiency coefficients over the proportion of budget support amount in 
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total public revenues of the recipient country. Tables 12 and 13 show the results of the 
regressions. 
The regression results are significant for both the fixed-effect model F(3, 94) = 
235.15, p <.000 and random-effects model Wald chi2(3) = 713.17, p< 0.000. The 
likelihood ratio test (Fisher test) revealed the presence of fixed-effects, F (7, 94) = 50.93, 
p< .0000. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test indicated the existence of random 
effects, chibar2(01) =   376.56, p <.0000. The Hausmann’s specification test confirmed 
the presence of fixed effects, chi2(3) = 1.02, p = .7959. 
The fixed-effects model provided the best estimates and was the most suitable for 
explaining technical efficiency by the proportion of budget support amount in total public 
revenues variable as well as the covariates of macroeconomic stability and level of 
corruption. Budget support as a share of total government revenue, β = .0276, t = 2.06, p 
= .0042 was significant, The Beta coefficient (.0276) indicates that there is a positive 
relationship between the efficiency of government spending and the proportion of budget 
support in total government revenue. The higher the volume of budget support a 
government receives compare to its total revenue, the higher its spending efficiency. 
Macroeconomic stability β = - .0024, t = 22.17, p < .0000 and the level of corruption, β = 
- .0013, z = 3.96, p < .0000 were also significant, suggesting the generation of efficiency 
gains as the proportion of budget support in total revenues increases. These results 
supported the hypothesis that there is a relationship over time between the share of 
budget support amount in total government revenue in WAEMU countries and the quality 




Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of 
Budget Support in Total Revenue with Covariates 
Variable β SE t p 
Share of Budget support in 
total government revenue 
.02762 .0134 2.06 .042 
Macroeconomic stability .0025 .0001 22.17 .000 
Corruption level .0013 .00003 3.96 .000 
Note. F (3,94) = 233.15, p < .0000, R² = .6826 
Table 13 
Random Effects Regression Analysis Predicting Public Spending Efficiency from Share of 
Budget Support in Total Revenue with Covariates 
Variable β SE z P 
Share of Budget support in 
total government revenue 
.02627 .0132 1.98 .048 
Macroeconomic stability .00247 .0001 22.48 .000 
Corruption level .00136 .00003 4.19 .000 
Note. Wald chi2 (3) = 713.17, p < .0000, R² = .6848 
RQ5: Influence of Initial Level of Governance on the Relationship between Budget 
Support and the Efficiency of Public Expenditure 
RQ5 was about whether there was a relationship between the amount of budget 
support and the efficiency of public expenditure for WAEMU countries over time. The 
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test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ5 consisted of introducing the lag of the 
efficiency coefficient variable in the previous regressions of public expenditure efficiency 
over budget support variables. The lagged efficiency coefficient is the efficiency 
coefficient a year before the current year. It measures the level of governance of a 
country before its engagement with budget support. The same regressions were run while 
replacing the lag of the efficiency coefficient by government effectiveness variable. 
The results showed that for both fixed effect and random effect models, the lag of 
the efficiency coefficient was significant for all budget support variables, including the 
budget support amount variable, which was nonsignificant to predict changes in public 
expenditure efficiency. For example, β = .8525, t = 14.22, p < .0000 with the budget 
dummy variable and β = .863, t = 14.91, p < .0000 with the proportion of budget support 
in government revenue for the fixed effect model. In the regressions, the various budget 
support variables, including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in 
total revenue, and the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant. 
These results suggested the possibility of a mediation role by the lag of the efficiency 
coefficient (initial level of governance quality) concerning budget support and efficiency 
coefficient (governance quality). 
Table 14 
Significance of Efficiency Coefficient Lag per Budget Support Variable Based on Fixed-
Effect Regressions Results 
 Efficiency Coefficient Lag 
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Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy .8526 14.22 .000 
Budget Support Amount .8713 15.08 .000 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
.8630 14.91 .000 
Share of Budget support in total aid .8444 14.57 .000 
 
Table 15 
Significance of Efficiency Coefficient Lag per Budget Support Variable Based on 
Random-Effect Regressions Results 
 Efficiency Coefficient Lag 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy 1.034 36.97 .000 
Budget Support Amount 1.034 36.91 .000 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
1.033 36.90 .000 
Share of Budget support in total aid 1.036 36.54 .000 
 
Baron and Kenny (1987) suggested three steps in conducting a mediation test. 
The first step is to test the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
If this relationship is significant, the second test is to add the third variable that is 
suspected to potentially mediate the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variable. If this third variable is significant while the independent becomes 
92 
 
nonsignificant, the third step is to test the relationship between the third variable and the 
independent variable. If this relationship is significant, then third variable is a mediator of 
the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. 
Following these steps, the test of the relationship between the lag of the technical 
efficiency coefficient and the budget support variables was significant. There were 
positive and significant relationships between the lagged technical efficiency coefficient 
and the various budget support variables. These results indicate that the previous/initial 
level of technical efficiency mediates the effect of budget support on public spending 
efficiency. In other words, budget support is likely to trigger a self-sustaining dynamic of 
public expenditure efficiency gains.  
Table 16 
 
Prediction of Efficiency Coefficients Lag by Budget Support Variables 
  β 
Budget Support Variable Fixed Effect Random Effect 
Budget Support Dummy 0,0160** 0,0154** 
Budget Support Amount 0,0309 0,0299 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
0,0059* 0,0057* 
Share of Budget support in total aid 0,0174* 0,0167* 
Note. legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
The substitution of public expenditure efficiency coefficient lag with the World 
Bank’s government effectiveness index did not yield significant results. The government 
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effectiveness index variable was nonsignificant. The significance of budget support 
variables (except for the dummy) also reduced in all regressions. The overall public 
governance setting in the aid recipient country did not affect efficiency gains that budget 
support can generate. 
Table 17 
Significance of Government Effectiveness Index per Budget Support Variable Based on 
Fixed-Effect Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy -.001 -0.16 .871 
Budget Support Amount .005 0.61 .543 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
.005 0.61 .542 
Share of Budget support in total aid .004 0.43 .667 
        
Table 18 
Significance of Government Effectiveness Index per Budget Support Variable Based on 
Random-Effect Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy .006 0.71 .476 
Budget Support Amount .007 0.87 .385 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
.007 0.88 .378 
Share of Budget support in total aid .006 0.71 .476 
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Overall, the initial governance setting did not predict public expenditure 
efficiency; neither did it predict the effect of budget support on public expenditure. The 
initial/previous level of public expenditure efficiency predicts and mediate the impact of 
the budget support on public expenditure efficiency. These results revealed some 
ambiguity on the role of the initial overall governance setting on the prediction of GSE 
efficiency by budget support.  
RQ6: Influence of Political Context on the Relationship between Budget Support 
and Public Expenditure Efficiency 
From the literature review, it was not clear whether and how institutional quality 
affects aid effectiveness. RQ6 was about whether level of democratization influences the 
relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency in WAEMU 
countries. The test of the directional hypothesis associated to RQ6 consisted of 
introducing the democracy index variable in the previous regressions of public 
expenditure efficiency over budget support variables. The same regressions were run 
while replacing the democracy index variable by the political stability index variable. 
The results showed that, for both fixed effect and random effect models, the 
democracy index variable was significant for most budget support variables, including 
the budget support amount variable. For example, β = .0713, t = 2.00, p = .048 with the 
budget support dummy variable and β = .0696, t = 1.98, p = .051 with the proportion of 
budget support in government revenue for the fixed effect model. The various budget 
support variables, including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in 
total revenue, and the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant. 
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These results suggested the possibility of mediation or moderator role by the political 
context variable. 
Table 19 
Significance of Democracy Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Fixed-Effect 
Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy 0.0713 2.00 .048 
Budget Support Amount 0.07195 2..02 .047 
Share of Budget support in total government 
revenue 
0.0696 1.98 .051 
Share of Budget support in total aid 0.6426 1.88 .064 
 
Table 20 
Significance of Democracy Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Random-Effects 
Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy 0.0701 2.05 .040 
Budget Support Amount 0.0707 2.07 .039 
Share of Budget support in total government 
revenue 
0.0687 2.03 .042 




The substitution of a democracy index with a political stability index generated 
significant results. The political stability index variable was significant. While the 
significance level was higher than the democracy index variable, the coefficients were 
lower. For example, β = 0.011, t = 4.24, p < .000 with the budget support dummy 
variable and β = 0.011, t = 4.01, p < .000 with the proportion of budget support in 
government revenue for the fixed effect model. The various budget support variables, 
including budget support dummy, the proportion of budget support in total revenue, and 
the proportion of budget support in total aid, were nonsignificant. 
Table 21 
Significance of Political Stability Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Fixed-
Effects Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
Budget Support Dummy 0.011 4.24 .000 
Budget Support Amount 0.011 4.26 .000 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
0.011 4.01 .000 
Share of Budget support in total aid 0.01 3.60 .001 
 
Table 22 
Significance of Political Stability Index per Budget Support Variable Based on Random-
Effects Regressions Results 
Budget Support Variable Β t p 
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Budget Support Dummy 0.009 2.85 .004 
Budget Support Amount 0.009 2.95 .003 
Share of Budget support in total 
government revenue 
0.009 3.26 .001 
Share of Budget support in total aid 0.009 3.13 .002 
 
Following Fairchild and Mackinon (2008)’s general model for testing moderation 
effects, the test of the interaction variable budget support X political stability index was 
significant. There were positive and significant relationships between the interaction 
variable (budget support X political stability index) and the government spending 
efficiency coefficient for all budget support variables. The introduction of the interaction 
variable also yielded significant coefficients for the budget support variables and political 
stability index variables. These results indicate that the political context mediates the 
effect of budget support on public spending efficiency. 
Overall, the political stability variable predicted public expenditure efficiency and 
moderated the relationship between budget support and public expenditure efficiency. 
These results supported the hypothesis that the political context measured by the level of 
democratization moderates the relationship between budget support and public 




Effect of Political Stability Index on the Relationship between Government Spending 
Efficiency and Budget Support using Fixed-Effect Model 
Variables β t P 
Budget Support Dummy .000** 1.96 .053 
 Political Stability Index .013*** 4.78 .000 
Budget Support X political 
stability  
.000** -2.95 .004 
 Macroeconomic Stability .002*** 20.46 .000 
 Corruption .001*** 3.74 .000 
Note: legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Table 24 
Effect of Political Stability Index on the Relationship between Government Spending 
Efficiency and Budget Support using Random-Effect Model 
Variables β t P 
Budget Support Dummy .000** 1.87 .061 
 Political Stability Index .010*** 3.62 .000 
Budget Support X political 
stability  
.000*** -2.65 .008 
 Macroeconomic Stability .002*** 18.89 .000 
 Corruption .001*** 3.89 .000 




The two SFA models yielded satisfactory public expenditure efficiency scores. 
Public expenditures, corruption levels, and macroeconomic stability predict government 
spending efficiency. Measures of political stability, population, and density were not 
significant to predict the quality of public governance. 
The benefits of budget support (dummy variable), the proportion of budget 
support amount in total government revenues, and the proportion of budget support 
amount in total aid predict government spending efficiency. The initial level of 
governance quality mediates the relationship between government spending efficiency 
and budget support for all budget support variables. The political stability index as well 
as the democratization index moderates the relationship between government spending 
efficiency and budget support for all budget support variables. 
Various tests revealed that random-effects model better fit data for some 
regressions, suggesting the presence of idiosyncrasies. Therefore, individual country 
characteristics matter for the relationships between budget support and government 
spending efficiency for selected variables. The effect of budget support on government 
spending efficiency is not uniformly homogeneous. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to explore the relationship between budget support 
and quality of public governance measured by efficiency of public spending in the 
production of human development. GSE coefficients as the dependent variable, were 
estimated using two SFA models. The estimated GSE coefficients were further related to 
budget support dummy, budget amount and the proportions of budget support amount in 
total aid and in total government revenues to assess the relationships between public 
governance quality and budget support.   
This chapter consists of analyses of the results of multiple regressions to explain 
implications for the research hypotheses. Donors’ fear of weak governance in the 
neediest countries seems confirmed by findings as GSE coefficients were relatively low 
for the WAEMU countries. Budget is an aid modality donors can use to provide the 
neediest countries with ODA while provoking quality institutional changes in recipient 
countries.  
Interpretation of the Findings 
Levels of Efficiency Coefficients in WAEMU Countries 
Guinea-Bissau appears to be the least efficient in terms of GSE, with an average 
GSE of 8.3% over the study period and inefficiency of up to 97.8%. Public expenditure in 
Guinea Bissau is heavily dominated by operating expenses, while investment, particularly 
in human capital, is low. According to the World Bank (2018), the country devoted 90% 
of domestic resources to salaries and other operating expenses between 2010 and 2017. 
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Although the share of public spending on health and education averaged 23% over the 
period between 2010 and 2017, wages constitute more than 90% of these allocations. 
There is, therefore, a situation where civil servants agents benefit from salaries but cannot 
deliver minimum public service in the absence of materials and supplies. 
Cote d'Ivoire is the most efficient country of the eight with an average GSE of 
19.6%. The country represents 40% of the total GDP of the WAEMU currency area. It 
has seen impressive economic and social developments in the 1980s in terms of 
economic growth and human development before getting into a political crisis between 
2002 and 2011. Since 2011, the country has been renewed with sustained economic 
growth, but social outcomes remain mixed with a life expectancy of 57.4 years and mean 
years of schooling of 5.2 years. The country still ranked 165th amongst 189 countries and 
territories classified by the HDI in 2018. 
Senegal is the most politically stable of the eight countries. The country has not 
experienced any coup or violent conflict since its independence in 1960. Nonetheless, 
levels of public spending efficiency remain low and on par with peers in the currency 
area (less than 14% on average). The country devotes a significant share of its resources 
to education (3.5% of GDP) and health (1.4%). However, it still ranks 166th with a life 
expectancy of 67.7 years and mean years of schooling of 3.1 years. 
Mali is the largest WAEMU country with a population density of 17 inhabitants 
per square kilometer. Nevertheless, the country recorded an average GSE of 14.6% which 
was above the averaged eight countries of 12.5%. The country does not, however, show 
social outcomes that are significantly different than its peers in the sample. In terms of 
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HDI, it was ranked 184th behind Benin (163) and Burkina Faso (182), which have an 
average efficiency below the regional average, but ahead of Niger (189). 
Ex-Ante Selectivity in Aid Allocation 
Relatively low levels of GSE with an average of 12.5% and variability between 
WAEMU countries from 8.3% in Guinea-Bissau to 20% in Cote d’Ivoire do not confirm 
the theories of ex-ante selectivity in aid allocation. All eight countries received budget 
support over the study period regardless of their level of efficiency. Between 1995 and 
2015, there were 21 budget support disbursements in Guinea-Bissau, the least efficient 
country, compared to an average of 15 disbursements for all eight countries. The average 
budget support disbursements were 15.3 for Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal with 
average GSE levels above the average of the eight countries. There was an average of 
14.4 budget support disbursements for the five other countries with an average GSE 
levels below the community average. While I used an economic measure of public 
governance quality, my results diverge from merit-based aid allocation Mounir (2015) 
put forward. The findings instead suggest that merit-based motivations are not the 
primary determinant in terms of the use of budget support by donors. 
Estimations revealed the presence of random effects. There are specific 
characteristics to each country which influence the benefits of budget support on public 
service delivery. These country-specific effects indicate the use of country-specific 
conditionalities by the donor when delivering budget support.  These results are an 
illustration of donors’ concerns regarding the aid recipient’s developmental preference as 
Cordello and Dell’ Ariccia (2007) argued. While the OECD recommended that budget 
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support policy measures should be technical, many budget support policy frameworks 
include legal and political policy measures explicitly or implicitly. These policy measures 
are incentives donors want to trigger for an explicit or implicit political objective. For 
instance, there were countries where the budget support policy framework included the 
adoption of a specific law. However, this adoption requires the parliament to be 
established, meaning the organization of legislative elections. 
Public Expenditure Efficiency Gains of Budget Support 
Budget support aid modality generates efficiency gains in public spending. The 
effect of budget support on public expenditure efficiency increases as the amount of aid 
allocated through budget support represents a significant proportion of total public 
resources or total aid received. These results confirm Swedlund (2012)’s findings that the 
use of budget support by a donor provide it with a seat at the table, voice amplification 
and the right to ask question in order to influence policy debates in the beneficiary 
countries. Donors can strengthen their policy influence on public spending by increasing 
the proportion of aid channeled through budget support. The fact that the proportion of 
budget support in total government revenue was determinant of public expenditure 
efficiency suggests that budget support can have countercyclical budgetary properties. In 
a context where domestic government revenues are low or diminished compared to aid 
received, the use of budget support can help to maintain efficient use of public resources, 
including foreign aid. 
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Budget Support and the Institutional Peril of Foreign Aid 
The study results did not confirm the hypothesis of the institutional peril of 
foreign aid argued by scholars like Asongu (2013). The initial level of public governance 
quality mediates the effect of budget support on public expenditure efficiency. The more 
efficient a country is before benefiting budget support, the more it will be possible for aid 
providers to trigger a self-sustained dynamic of the efficiency of public services by using 
budget support. The fact that the initial level of efficiency mediates the relationship 
between budget support and institutional quality supports Mounir (2015)’s idea that the 
budget support policy framework the donor and the recipient agree to implement 
encourages the aid beneficiary to anticipate the reaction of the donor in an ex-post 
political conditionality dynamic. In an aid contract based on budget support modality, the 
beneficiary knows that its performance will determine the donor’s willingness to disburse 
the pledged aid amount. The recipient is thus encouraged to reduce the asymmetry of 
information and demonstrate to the donor its readiness to use aid effectively. However, 
my study adds to the literature that the recipient’s consent to cooperate depends on the 
weight of the expected aid in its total income. 
According to Bourguignon and Platteau (2015), when the initial public 
governance quality is too low in an aid recipient country compared to the best performing 
countries, donors will exclude this recipient from aid allocation if the available aid is 
limited. My finding is that aid can be effective in a recipient country with low public 
governance quality if donors deliver a high proportion of total aid to be allocated to the 
country through budget support. The imposition of disciplinary measures by donors 
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through budget support seem to compensate the public governance quality gap between 
the least-performing and best-performing countries and can influence the efficient use of 
public resources by recipients with low public governance quality. 
Limitations 
The main limitation of this study was the assumption that any amount of aid 
delivered through budget support modality indicates the donor's intention to influence 
public governance quality in the recipient countries. As underlined earlier, budget support 
is an instrument donor use to motivate aid recipients to undertake institutional changes 
that will improve aid effectiveness. Therefore, the use of aid amount delivered through 
budget support as the key independent variable in this study was based on the assumption 
that any disbursement made by a donor within the framework of budget support indicates 
an agreement between the donor and the recipient to implement policy reforms that 
improves public governance quality in the recipient country. An additional unit of aid 
amount delivered through budget support, is also a proxy of other policy reforms the 
recipient government commits to implement. There is no distinction between sectoral and 
general budget support in this study. 
By using government spending efficiency as the primary dependent variable, I 
assumed that the primary objective of improving governance settings in recipient 
countries is to ensure that they spend public revenues efficiently The role of a responsible 
and accountable government in a modern democratic society is to ensure that resources 
are allocated efficiently for collective well-being. The idea that budget support can 
influence the emergence of such governments in recipient countries translates the use of 
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disciplining measures by donors to incite recipient governments to better allocate and 
spend public resources, to produce development outcomes. As implication, aid recipients 
allocate aid amount received through budget support in the same manner they use 
government revenues.  
The estimation of public expenditure efficiency coefficient was based on a human 
development index which is a composite index of national income, education and health. 
I thus assumed that the primary objective of a government in the considered WAEMU 
countries for the study period was to advance human development as summarized by the 
MDGs. Additionally, a limitation of the study is its geographical delimitation that may 
affect the generalizability of the findings. Since WAEMU is a currency zone, this may 
have influences on the results as these countries use harmonized public governance rules. 
Therefore, the absence of comparable fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies may 
reveal divergent results for other countries. 
Recommendations  
This study focuses on eight countries. Using a large sample of countries receiving 
budget support could further improve the findings. With a larger sample of countries, 
temporal variations and their implications could be tested while maintaining a suitable 
level of degree of freedom and thus robustness. Another avenue for future research would 
be breaking down the human development index and using each of the sub-indexes. 
Specific outcome indicators regarding education and health could also be considered on 
each dimension of the sub-index. This would make it possible to assess the contribution 
of each dimension or component of the human development index to government 
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spending efficiency and the relationship between each dimension and budget support. A 
comparative study with project/program aid would be useful to assess the contribution of 
budget support as an aid delivery modality to the efficient delivery of public services. 
Other variables of public service delivery may also be tested. 
Implications 
The findings of my study have shown that Donors can use aid as an instrument to 
improve governance in recipient countries. With budget support, donors have a policy 
window not to ex-ante exclude the neediest recipient countries-especially - based on their 
governance setting. Aid providers can allocate aid to countries with weak public 
governance by imposing disciplinary measures thought support. When they do, aid 
providers should incorporate in budget support policy framework policy measures to 
improve the efficiency of the public service as this will result in increased development 
expenditures in the recipient country. The disciplinary measures are likely to force those 
in power in WAEMU countries to reduce aid diversion and effectively use aid to promote 
human development in terms of education, health, and wealth creation. Aid will reach the 
most impoverished populations in WAEMU countries. 
If a significant portion of aid is channeled through conditional budget support, it 
can strengthen the efficiency of public spending and improve the delivery of expected 
public services. Recipient countries will be more sensitive to the disciplinary 
requirements of donors if their resources are limited. For example, rather than suspending 
aid for the neediest in times of political crisis, donors can use budget support to maintain 
a minimum level of efficiency and public service. Thus, in a context of crisis such as 
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political instability, which is the case for many fragile countries, it would be possible for 
donors through budget support, to preserve a minimum level of aid effectiveness and 
protect the poorest against deterioration of their precarious situation. The budget support 
policy framework can incorporate measures such as pro-poor policies or expenditures and 
donors can encourage governments to prioritize the most disadvantaged through better 
allocation and use of aid. 
The higher the amount of total aid a country receives, the more effective it will be 
through conditional budget support in countries with weak governance. The more 
countries receiving aid have a high level of own resources, the more it will be possible 
for the donor to influence the proper use of these resources through budget support. 
Therefore, using budget support in an aid-orphan country might not be relevant unless it 
constitutes a significant share of government revenues. Also, using budget support in an 
aid-darling country would be relevant if it represents a relative high proportion of total 
aid the country benefits. In this case, donors can use budget support to help strengthen 
social accountability and citizen control, not only on domestic resources but also on aid 
received.  
Another implication of the study is that the involvement of donors in fragile states 
such as Guinea-Bissau amongst WAEMU countries where collection of domestic 
resources is low can be done through budget support. Even in countries with abundant 
domestic resources such as countries endowed with natural resources, budget support 
gives the donor the possibility of influencing the use of the recipient’s own resources 
efficiently. The absolute amount of budget support is not decisive. However, donors 
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would benefit from coordinating their efforts to have more influence on the use of 
resources. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the relationship between 
budget support and public expenditures efficiency as an indicator of public governance 
quality in WAEMU countries. The analysis was made by assessing the possibility of 
improving public service delivery through disciplinary measures accompanying budget 
support amount donors deliver to WAEMU countries. The eight WAEMU countries 
which benefited from budget support between 1995 and 2015 served as a field of 
investigation. This currency area offered the advantage of comparable data given the 
level of harmonization of budgetary policies within the region. 
The analysis was conducted in three stages. First, efficiency was estimated using 
SFA where a measure of human development was regressed against measures of GDP, 
public expenditures, macroeconomic stability, and measures of population and density. 
The results were efficiency scores for each of the WAEMU countries. Second, the effects 
of budget support were studied in terms of its relationship with government efficiency 
scores. The second stage consisted of regressing the institutional quality variable against 
different budget support variables using panel data regressions involving both fixed and 
random effects models. The third stage was to test for mediation and moderation of 
selected variables like initial level of government effectiveness, political context and 
democratization in relation to efficiency. The findings indicate that corruption level and 
macroeconomic stability influence government efficiency levels. The benefits of budget 
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support, the proportion of budget support amount in government revenues and the 
proportion of budget support amount in total aid predict public expenditures efficiency. 
This prediction is mediated by the initial level of efficiency and moderated by the 
political context.  
My findings have suggested that budget support can improve aid effectiveness, 
regardless of the level of corruption and initial governance in the aid recipient country. 
Budget support offers the opportunity to improve the delivery of public services. Through 
budget support mechanism, donors and recipient associate money with policy inputs to 
reinforce development outcomes resulting from the use of financial resources. Budget 
support is, therefore, a means by which aid providers can reconcile need and governance 
to continue provide the neediest and poorly governed countries with ODA. In addition to 
technical disciplinary procedures usually considered in budget support, aid providers can 
reinforce aid effectiveness by also considering measures that promote democratic 
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Appendix A: Correlation Table 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8)   (9)   (10)   (11)   (12)   (13)   (14)   (15)   (16)   (17)   (18)   (19)   (20)   (21)   (22)   (23) 
 (1) hdi 1.000 
 (2) gov_rev 0.290 1.000 
 (3) gov_dep 0.343 0.975 1.000 
 (4) gov_int 0.332 0.770 0.768 1.000 
 (5) gov_net 0.335 0.971 0.998 0.726 1.000 













0.049 0.935 1.000 
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-
0.011 
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-
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-
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-
0.012 























0.780 0.754 1.000 
 (22) corr 0.166 0.234 0.291 
-
0.043 












































Appendix B: Estimation of Efficiency Coefficients 
Jondrow et al (1982) 
                                                                             
True fixed-effects model (half-normal)                                   Number of obs =       176 
Group variable: pays1                                                Number of groups =         8 
Time variable: year                                                    Obs per group: min =        22 
                                                                                                                                            avg = 22,0 
                                                                                                                                        max = 22 
                                                                                                                        Prob > chi2   =    0,0000 
Log likelihood =   469,8317                                                     Wald chi2(2) =    713,30 
 
 hdi   Coef.  Std.Err.  Z  P>z  [95%Conf.  Interval] 
Frontier      
gov_net  ,0000458 3,91e-06 11,69 0,000 ,0000381 ,0000534 
macro_s  ,0009766 ,0001082 9,03 0,000 ,0007645 ,0011886 
Usigma        
_cons  -7,218909 ,2000037 -36,09 0,000 -7,610909 -6,826909 
Vsigma        
_cons  -9,859782 ,5219419 -18,89 0,000 -10,88277 -8,836795 
sigma_u  ,0270666 ,0027067 10,00 0,000 ,0222491 ,0329273 
sigma_v  ,0072273 ,0018861 3,83 0,000 ,0043335 ,0120535 
lambda  3,745056 ,0042533 880,51 0,000 3,73672 3,753393 
 
 
Battese and Coelli (1988) 
 
True fixed-effects model (truncated-normal)                                     Number of obs =       176 
Group variable: pays1                                                                        Number of groups =         8 
Time variable: year                                                                           Obs per group: min =        22 
                                                                                                                              avg =      22,0 
                                                                                                                             max  =        22 
                                                                                                                   Prob > chi2   =    0,0000 
Log likelihood =   483,2551                                                                     Wald chi2(2)  =    757,41 
 
 hdi   Coef.  Std.Err.  z  P>z  [95%Conf.  Interval] 
Frontier      
gov_net  .0000532 3.24e-06 16.44 0.000 .0000469 .0000596 
macro_s  .0008997 .0000778 11.56 0.000 .0007471 .0010522 
Mu            
_cons  -24.38288 65.25089 -0.37 0.709 -152.2723 103.5065 
Usigma        
_cons  -.8583319 2.673401 -0.32 0.748 -6.098101 4.381437 
Vsigma        
_cons  -10.12967 .4091437 -24.76 0.000 -10.93158 -9.327764 
sigma_u  .6510519 .8702613 0.75 0.454 .0474039 8.941636 
sigma_v  .006315 .0012919 4.89 0.000 .004229 .0094298 




Appendix C: Levels of Inefficiency 
Variable Obs Mean Variance Std. Dev Min Max 
ineff_jn82~n 176 .8746907 .0023582 .0485614 .6655428 .9779519 
ineff_bc88~n 176 .8766275 .0027203 .0521568 .6458101 .9793357 
 
Pays Variable Mean p50 Variance sd min max 
Bénin 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8919995 .8973273 .0008937 .0298953 .8344421 .9405446 
ineff_bc88~n .8951965 .9007773 .0009418 .0306891 .8340414 .943987 
Burkina-
Faso 
       
ineff_jn82~n .880433 .8893657 .0011738 .0342602 .8209638 .9291212 
ineff_bc88~n .8817303 .8915913 .001336 .0365507 .8171456 .9323546 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8041907 .8187746 .0036421 .0603498 .6655428 .8899551 
ineff_bc88~n .7995348 .8163496 .0042673 .0653243 .6458101 .8895658 
Guinea 
Bissau 
       
ineff_jn82~n .9165315 .9150609 .0005928 .0243475 .8886813 .9779519 
ineff_bc88~n .9224052 .9211973 .0005145 .0226835 .8960081 .9793357 
Mali 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8535265 .863311 .0012445 .0352777 .78584 .9079115 
ineff_bc88~n .8568815 .8668615 .0013546 .0368051 .7850065 .9124921 
Niger 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8905181 .9005517 .0009882 .0314354 .8292708 .932228 
ineff_bc88~n .8936217 .90476 .001121 .0334808 .8267648 .9359555 
Sénégal 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8606772 .8697207 .0015895 .0398682 .797365 .9164798 
ineff_bc88~n .8590277 .8688396 .001921 .0438289 .7887455 .9192768 
Togo 
       
ineff_jn82~n .8996493 .9075533 .0005478 .0234055 .8591654 .9367778 








Appendix D: Levels of Efficiency 
Variable Mean p50 sd variance min max 
eff_jn82_hn .1253093 .1137091 .0485614 .0023582 .0220481 .3344572 
eff_bc88_tn .1233725 .110612 .0521568 .0027203 .0206643 .3541899 
 
Pays Variable Mean p50 variance sd min max 
Bénin 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1080005 .1026727 .0298953 .0008937 .0594554 .1655579 
eff_bc88_tn .1048035 .0992227 .0306892 .0009418 .056013 .1659587 
Burkina-
Faso 
       
eff_jn82_hn .119567 .1106343 .0342602 .0011738 .0708788 .1790362 
eff_bc88_tn .1182697 .1084087 .0365507 .001336 .0676454 .1828544 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1958093 .1812254 .0603498 .0036421 .1100449 .3344572 
eff_bc88_tn .2004652 .1836504 .0653243 .0042673 .1104342 .3541899 
Guinea 
Bissau 
       
eff_jn82_hn .0834685 .0849391 .0243475 .0005928 .0220481 .1113187 
eff_bc88_tn .0775948 .0788027 .0226835 .0005145 .0206643 .1039918 
Mali 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1464735 .136689 .0352777 .0012445 .0920885 .21416 
eff_bc88_tn .1431185 .1331385 .0368051 .0013546 .0875079 .2149935 
Niger 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1094819 .0994483 .0314354 .0009882 .067772 .1707291 
eff_bc88_tn .1063783 .09524 .0334808 .001121 .0640445 .1732352 
Sénégal 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1393228 .1302793 .0398682 .0015895 .0835202 .2026351 
eff_bc88_tn .1409723 .1311604 .0438289 .001921 .0807232 .2112545 
Togo 
       
eff_jn82_hn .1003507 .0924467 .0234055 .0005478 .0632222 .1408346 
eff_bc88_tn .095378 .0871374 .0233787 .0005466 .0594156 .1363958 
 
